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Abstract of thesis 
This thesis examines industrialisation, politics, banking and social instability in late 
Imperial Russia to address three central issues in economics and finance: (1) the role of 
government in effecting the stability of the banking sector; (2) the role of government in 
preserving banking and economic stability during an episode of financial distress; and 
(3) the role of government, and of other key groups in the economy, in the redistribution 
of income and wealth during and following a financial crisis. 
My dissertation traces a critical period in Russia’s history: 1893 to 1905. The 
early-to-mid-1890s were characterised by rapid industrial growth, which was driven by 
protectionist policies and the state procurement of industrial products. The period 1899-
1902 saw a severe financial and industrial crisis. The subsequent period 1903-1905 was 
marked by widespread labour strikes at industrial enterprises, a war with Japan, and a 
nation-wide revolution in 1905. In this twelve-year window, Russia went from robust 
and rapid economic growth to a financial crisis and then to social unrest and political 
reforms. 
My main findings are as follows. First, the national development policies of the 
1890s incentivised, although did not compel, commercial banks to finance 
industrialisation. When industry experienced a slowdown during the financial crisis of 
1899-1902, banks sustained devastating losses. This evidence suggests that national 
development policies had a destabilizing impact on bank performance. 
 Second, in response to the financial crisis, the State Bank, a quasi-central bank 
of Russia, implemented a multifaceted approach to crisis containment. I find that this 
multifaceted approach was successful in maintaining price, employment, and financial 
stability. The evidence also suggests that the State Bank’s crisis response was identical 
to the types of policies employed over a century later by the Federal Reserve during the 
2007-09 financial crisis. 
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Third, in response to the financial crisis, the Russian government, along-side 
privately-owned industry, transferred income and wealth from ordinary workers to 
industrialists and investors. The evidence also suggests that industry forced the labour 
force to either work longer hours or more intensively. The distributional effect appears to 
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1.1. The role of the government 
The first issue I investigate in this dissertation is the role of state policies of the 1890s in 
bank performance during the Russian financial crisis at the turn of the 19th century. The 
financial crisis of 1899-1902 was characterised by bank distress, including bank failures, 
stock market downturn, and a shortage of capital. The crisis interrupted the rapid 
industrialisation that Russia was undergoing in the 1890s. Credit shortages in Europe 
forced foreign investors to curtail investments in Russian government bonds and 
securities of industrial enterprises. This led to major losses among heavy industrial 
companies, as private and later state demand for their products fell. Regulatory mark-to-
market requirements forced banks to register large losses on their investment portfolios 
(Gindin, 1950). From official bank audits, we know that key banks were practically 
bankrupt or on the verge of collapse in the early stages of the crisis (Bovykin, 1984). The 
failure of key banks would have put an end to Russia’s rapid industrialisation, as banks 
supplied over half of all industrial finance (Bovykin, 1967). 
There has been a long-standing literature, ranging from Hammond (1957) to 
Calomiris & Haber (2014) to Turner (2014) that has argued that the government can 
contribute to, and even, originate banking crises. In Chapter 2, I combine historical 
evidence with a quantitative approach to show that the Russian national policies of the 
1890s, targeted at the development of industry, enticed banks to over-invest in industrial 
enterprises, leading to disastrous bank losses during the crisis of 1899-1902. The main 
contribution of this chapter is twofold: (1) where previous scholarship has largely 
remained descriptive, I explicitly engage with economic theories in an attempt to 
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uncover causal connections between different factors; and (2) provide quantitative 
evidence to a debate that has thus far come in the form of narrative evidence. 
I use two hand-collected datasets to address my question in Chapter 2. One 
dataset is on banks’ financial performance from The Consolidated Balance Sheets 
(Golubev, 1899-1902a) and Russian Banks (Golubev, 1899b). The other consists of the 
names of bank board members, government officials, and corporate board members, 
collected from Address-Calendar (1898) and Russian Banks (Golubev, 1899b). I also 
gather narrative evidence from secondary sources to identify what type of information 
relating to industrialisation policies passed from officials and corporate board members 
to bank board members. I find that the banks that experienced greater distress in the 
crisis had more personal connections to government officials who were close to the 
epicentre of policymaking. Additionally, the banks that suffered greater distress had 
more personal ties to companies that had been highly stimulated by state policies to 
expand production. Taken together, these two findings point to a destabilising impact of 
national development policies on bank performance. 
The second question I address in my dissertation is a topic of a recent debate 
relating to how a central bank should resolve a major financial crisis. Some scholars 
have argued for limiting a central bank’s toolkit to a classical lender-of-last-resort 
(Taylor, 2014), as initially prescribed by Bagehot (1873). Others have called for a more 
activist central bank approach to crisis management (Bernanke, 2015). 
In Chapter 3, I add a historical perspective to this debate by analysing the 
response employed by the State Bank, the quasi-central bank of Russia, in the systemic 
crisis of 1899-1902. To quantify the State Bank’s policy actions, I hand-collected 
financial statements of the State Bank from the Russian State Library. To understand the 
motivation behind the State Bank’s policy measures, I gathered records of the State 
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Bank’s policy decisions from the Russian State Historical Archive. This methodological 
approach helps me understand the reasons behind the State Bank’s actions. 
I find that the State Bank departed from the Bagehotian doctrine of liquidity 
provision early on in the financial crisis. Instead the State Bank employed a multifaceted 
approach to resolving the crisis, including liquidity provision to financial institutions, 
liquidity provision to individual stock-market investors, acquisition of securities from 
investors, lending to non-financial institutions, and emergency lending to specific 
financial institutions. 
This approach allowed the State Bank to maintain price, employment, and 
financial stability. The evidence also suggests that the State Bank’s approach was 
equivalent to the types of policies employed over a century later by the Federal Reserve 
during the 2007-2009 financial crisis. The findings imply that it is worthwhile for a 
central bank to have multiple tools at its disposal to combat a crisis. 
The third question I examine in this dissertation is the mechanisms through 
which financial crises can lead to social unrest. Existing literature is divided on this 
topic. One side has claimed that financial and economic crises directly depreciate 
households’ income and wealth, compelling them to seek changes on the streets or at the 
polls (Brender & Drazen, 2008; De Bromhead et al., 2013; Lindgren & Vernby, 2016). 
An alternative and minority view has been that the way the government responds to 
financial distress has a redistributive effect on households’ income and wealth (Halac & 
Schmukler, 2004; Stiglitz, 2013), again compelling households to seek changes. 
In Chapter 4, I ask two questions: (1) what was the immediate effect of the 
financial crisis of 1899-1902 on key participants in the economy – that is banks, 
industry, and the government, and (2) how did these participants respond to the crisis 
and in the process affect the fourth key group in the economy: the working class? To 
answer these questions, I employ aggregate-level data on the economic performance of 
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the aforementioned participants in the economy, which I collected from a series of 
yearbooks published by the Russian Ministry of Finance. I also collected economic and 
non-economic data pertaining to the aforementioned participants from a variety of 
secondary sources. I supplement these quantitative data with a historical narrative 
describing how these four groups of participants responded to the crisis of 1899-1902. 
I find that in response to the financial crisis of 1899-1902, the government 
attempted to shield industry from losses. As a result, it transferred wealth from ordinary 
workers to industrialists and shareholders. The recipients of transfers weathered the 
crisis well and profited during the recovery, whereas workers’ wages and wealth 
stagnated. I also find that industry, in its own attempt to sustain the high profits of the 
1890s, compelled the labour force to either work longer hours, or to work more 
intensively. Taken together, the findings suggest that it was the response to the crisis not 
only by the government, but also by other key participants in the economy, such as 
industry, that exacerbated the material and physical well-being of workers. The extant 
literature has established that workers’ poor working and living conditions were the 
central reason behind the occurrence of labour strikes (Korelin et al., 2005). In light of 
this fact, my findings suggest that the financial crisis, and the policies used to combat it, 
contributed to worker unrest, and ultimately to the 1905 revolution. 
1.2. Contribution to Russian economic history 
Scholarship in Russian economic history is abundant with historical studies that are not 
cliometric in nature. These studies do not explicitly use economic theory and quantitative 
methods to draw causal connections between different variables. My contribution is to 
build on these works and add a quantitative, economic perspective to the historiography. 
However, I do so in a way that remains sensitive to the history. I am of the view that 
good cliometrics requires the researcher to go beyond the statistical methods. This may 
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require the use of non-quantitative evidence, such as archival material and secondary 
sources. 
The availability of vast secondary source material allowed me to pool together 
pieces of data and information to construct the picture of the government policies of the 
1890s and the impact these policies had on the expansion of industry. For Chapter 2, I 
also gathered records documenting how the government affected banks’ inclination to 
finance industry. In particular, I found real examples of bankers receiving privileged 
information on state procurement orders and examples of how bankers acted on this 
information. This historical foundation, which itself is underpinned by the extensive 
work of Russian historians, permits me to not merely claim that interlocks between 
government official and bankers brought distress to banks, but to go beyond interlocks 
and conclude that it was national development policies that were ultimately responsible 
for the near-failure of banks. 
Piecing together the historical narrative allows me to support Gerschenkron’s 
(1962) arguments that the state was a primary driver of economic development in the 
1890s. In particular, Gerschenkron argued that the Russian state replaced weak private 
sector demand for industrial products with its own procurement. The new narrative also 
allows me to re-evaluate Gregory’s (1991, 1994) view that the Russian state was not a 
vital force in the industrialisation of the 1890s. Gregory contends that, among other 
reasons, state expenditures on industrial products, such as military hardware, were too 
small to were too small to have a meaningful impact on industrial growth. 
In many cases, Gerschenkron’s arguments are not substantiated with hard data. 
Whereas Gregory greatly relies on the analyses conducted in the 1960s by historians 
based outside of Russia. Because the Soviet Union was closed to foreign visitors at that 
time, these historians had to rely on limited datasets. For these reasons, the claims 
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presented by both Gerschenkron and Gregory, whether right or wrong, require updated, 
stronger evidence. Chapter 2 addresses this issue. 
My Chapter 3, on the State Bank rescue operations, augments the history of 
central banking by documenting one of the first episodes in the history of central 
banking where a substantial and comprehensive multifaceted approach to crisis 
containment was employed. This is important for historical purposes because it helps us 
to develop counterfactuals of subsequent crises: had contemporary policy makers in 
Europe and the United State learned about the State Bank’s anti-crisis measures, perhaps 
the not-so-distant financial panic of 1907 would have been largely mitigated. Indeed, 
even during the Great Depression, central banks elsewhere did not employ the approach 
of the State Bank. It was perhaps only the 2008-2009 global financial crisis in which 
Western central banks and governments used a comprehensive multifaceted approach to 
crisis containment pioneered by the Russian State Bank. 
My Chapter 4, on the distributional effects of the financial crisis of 1899-1902, 
augments the literature on the causes of the First Russian Revolution of 1905. The 
central cause of the revolution has been identified as unacceptable living and working 
conditions of industrial workers. A minority view has argued that the crisis of 1899-1902 
and the government’s response to the crisis contributed to the revolutionary movement 
(Gefter 1953, 1955; Gindin, 1950; Lenin, 1963). My evidence adds more weight to view 
that the crisis response and its distributional consequences contributed to the revolution. 
1.3. Methodology and sources 
This section discusses the advantages and disadvantages of the methodology and sources 
used in the chapters. In Chapter 2, I combine a narrative and empirical approaches. In the 
first part of the chapter, I piece together a historical narrative of what happened in the 
1890s, relying on the extensive archival work of Soviet and Russian historians. The 
19 
evidence points that the industrialization policies were the root cause of bank distress 
during the financial crisis of 1899-1902. In the second part of the chapter, I use 
regression analysis to test the validity of these historical findings. A combination of 
historical evidence and empirical analysis is a key strength of this chapter’s 
methodology. 
On the other hand, because I relate bank distress to national development 
policies, it is possible that there are many causes other than the industrialisation policies 
that could have driven banks’ investment and lending decisions. I address as many 
alternative causes as possible, including the government expectation of banks to finance 
industry, the State Bank’s policy towards banks, and the potential existence of rent-
seeking between bankers and government officials. Because I address these possible 
causes using only narrative evidence, the lack of empirical tests in regards to alternative 
causes is a methodological weakness. 
A key strength of the sources used in Chapter 2 is that I am able to put together a 
historical narrative of the 1890s by relying on extensive secondary literature. I am 
standing on the shoulders of historians who spent their careers collecting data and 
information. However, one shortcoming of relying heavily on secondary material is that 
in many instances the historians summarized primary documents in their own words, 
which might not precisely reflect the content of original documents. 
In Chapter 3, my methodology is to quantify the assistance package and describe 
each of the State Bank’s actions based on financial statement data and the State Bank’s 
annual reports. I then look at macroeconomic and financial variables to identify how 
successful the banking sector and the broader economy were in weathering the financial 
crisis of 1899-1902. 
It might, however, be argued that this method lacks a deeper empirical analysis. 
What is needed is a regression analysis that identifies the extent to which the State 
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Bank’s actions, foreign capital, and industry’s productivity were each responsible for 
overcoming the crisis. I believe this method is not essential. That is because using 
aggregate level data allows me to separate the effect of the above-mentioned factors on 
the banking sector and the economy. In particular, macro-level data shows that foreign 
capital dried up and interest rates abroad increased, and thus could not have mitigated the 
effects of the crisis. From the evidence in Chapter 4, we know that the response to the 
crisis by industrial companies only prolonged the duration of the crisis. Consumption 
expenditures of households also did not help alleviate the financial turmoil. Thus, we can 
rule out these potential determinants. What is left are the rescue actions of the State Bank 
and fiscal authorities as the only economic players that could make a positive impact. In 
other words, the lack of statistical analysis is not necessarily a weakness of this chapter’s 
methodology. 
The strength of the sources used in Chapter 3 is that the sources mostly come in 
the form of official documents. The weakness of official documents as a source is that in 
its annual reports the State Bank tried to make the best impression on the reader by 
describing in detail the rescue operations that were apparently helpful to the banking 
sector and profitable to the State Bank, while providing little information on the 
programmes that apparently resulted in losses to the State Bank. For instance, there is 
little description of bailouts of individual financial institutions. To fill in the missing 
information, I had to rely on secondary material written by contemporary analysts. 
Chapter 4 employs aggregate-level financial data to show that in the process of 
overcoming the financial crisis of 1899-1902, the Russian government assisted industry 
and banks, while imposing a higher economic burden on the working class. I believe the 
use of macro-level data is appropriate to establish the distributional effects as it is 
sufficient to know what happened to finances of major economic participants at an 
aggregate level. 
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In this chapter, I also try to go beyond documenting the occurrence of the 
distributional effect, and suggest that there is a link between the redistribution of income 
and wealth and the occurrence of labour strikes in the years leading up to the Revolution 
of 1905. To make this point, I rely on aggregate-level data and narrative evidence. The 
weak point of this method is that it is not possible to establish a causal relationship 
between financial redistributions and worker strikes. However, I believe that the 
evidence is sufficient to motivate the need for further empirical research, which I discuss 
in the end of the chapter. 
The strength of the sources used in Chapter 4 is that the data is sufficiently 
extensive and detailed to establish the occurrence of the distributional effect. However, 
the data used to trace the impact of industry on workers is not as sound as it does not 
cover the entire population of workers. For example, when documenting worker injuries, 
data is available only on mining plants and coal, iron, manganese, and copper mines, 




Government-made bank distress: 
industrialisation policies and the Russian financial crisis of 1899-1902 
2.1. Introduction 
In the mid- to late 1890s, the Russian Empire was undergoing exceptional industrial 
growth. The value of manufactured output rose at an annual rate of nearly ten per cent 
between 1893 and 1900 (Borodkin, 2011a, 2011c), elevating the country to the fifth 
largest manufacturing producer in the world (League of Nations, 1945). The state acted 
as a catalyst for economic growth by procuring industrial products and stimulating 
industrial companies to expand operations to match constantly-rising state and private 
sector demand (Gindin, 2007c). Simultaneously, development policies incentivized 
commercial banks to finance industry, as will be shown throughout the chapter.  In 1899, 
the successful setup between the government, the banking sector, and industry started to 
come apart due to a sudden drop in the rate of inflow of European capital to Russian 
government bonds and securities of industrial enterprises. This led to a rapid stock 
market decline, recession, and disastrous corporate performance – together culminating 
in overwhelming losses among banks (Bovykin, 1967, 1984). Because banks supplied 
over half of all financing received by the industrial sector, banking distress put the 
successes of the 1890s at stake. 
What caused the reversal in the robust industrial growth? Among a number of 
possible causes, one reason offered by the Minister of Finance himself was the state 
industrialisation policies of the 1890s, which had unduly stimulated heavy industry, 
leading to its overbuilding and eventual contraction (Gindin, 1996). The purpose of this 
chapter is to uncover whether, and to what extent, government policies contributed to 
bank losses in the crisis of 1899-1902. The importance of this enquiry comes from the 
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fact that the influence of the state on a banking system is often immense and can be 
negative. When it is negative, banking distress and failure might follow, which, in turn, 
are likely to lead to the fall in the supply of money (Friedman & Schwartz, 1963) along 
with other non-monetary effects (Bernanke, 1983; Hall, 2010) that impair aggregate 
economic activity. 
I identify three channels through which the Russian government affected banks’ 
inclination to finance industry and, consequently, banks’ financial outcomes. The first 
channel was information that banks gathered by means of personal connections with 
government officials and corporate board members. In particular, banks obtained 
information about the future course of industrialisation policies, such as what industry 
the government would protect and support, and information about state procurement 
decisions, such as what factory would receive a lucrative procurement contract. The 
second channel was the government’s expectation of banks to finance the modernisation 
of industry. Third was the development policy of the State Bank, a quasi-central bank of 
Russia, by means of which the State Bank provided credit to banks on a constant basis. 
The focus of this chapter is on the first channel because the other two channels 
contributed little to the increase in bank financing of industry, as discussed later. 
In order to trace the passage of information from the state to the banking sector, I 
record personal connections, or more formally interlocks, between board members at 
banks, government officials, and board members at companies.1 Specifically, a well-
informed political interlock is recorded when a bank board member, or his sibling, is part 
of a group of top government officials who were well-informed – due to being in close 
contact with the Finance Minister Sergei Witte – about state procurement decisions and 
the expected trajectory of the industrialisation policies. The Finance Minister Witte was 
1
 For lucidity, this chapter refers to a member of a board of directors or a management committee 
as simply a board member, unless otherwise specified. 
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at the epicenter of policymaking as he was the architect of the industrialisation policies 
and the final decision-maker on state procurement contracts (Bovykin, 1967; Shepelev, 
1981). 
Separately, a heavy industry interlock is recorded when a bank board member is 
also a board member at a heavy industrial firm, or when the banker’s sibling serves in 
that role. This type of interlock presents an alternative way of tracing the effect of state 
policies on bank performance. This is because heavy industrial firms were highly reliant 
on state procurement, which fell during the crisis, leading to industry losses. Moreover, 
the government itself acknowledged the danger posed by the existence of corporate 
interlocks. In one of the few corporate laws passed in response to the crisis, authorities 
prohibited banks’ executive board members from serving on corporations’ boards 
(Complete Collection of Laws, 1903). On top of this, I register three additional types of 
interlocks: to capture bankers’ connections with a wider range of government officials 
and non-financial companies, and to trace connections with competitor banks. 
Next, I determine how the presence of government, industrial, and banking 
connections at each bank affected bank performance during the crisis. Bank distress is 
measured in the form of (1) net losses banks sustained on investment portfolios over the 
entire crisis period, and (2) the drop in bank share price over the first year of the crisis, 
which was the only period throughout the crisis that was chiefly free from direct 
government intervention in the stock market. 
My main finding is that the banks that experienced greater distress during the 
crisis had more connections to government officials who were well-informed about the 
industrialisation policies and/or state procurement contacts in the lead-up to the crisis. 
The inference is that the banks that had been influenced most by these policies exposed 
themselves financially to heavy industrial companies and, as a result, experienced greater 
losses. 
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Additionally, I find that the banks that experienced greater distress during the 
crisis had more personal connections to heavy industrial companies. The interpretation is 
that the banks that suffered heavier losses had greater exposure, either via direct loan 
financing or securities underwriting, to companies most stimulated by state policies. Put 
together, these two complementary findings indicate a negative effect of national 
development policies on bank performance during Russia’s state-led growth. Aside from 
this, I find that the relationship between personal ties between competitor banks and 
bank performance to be inconclusive. 
The findings of this chapter add to fours strands of literature. First, the chapter 
provides empirical evidence in support of a long-standing belief that the government can 
contribute to, and even originate, banking crises. Research on this subject comes in the 
form of descriptive evidence and hypotheses (Hammond, 1957; Cameron, 1967; 
Krugman, 1998; Cassis, 2002; Rajan, 2011; Calomiris & Haber, 2014; Turner, 2014). 
For example, Calomiris & Haber (2014) argue that the root cause of the 2007-09 
financial crisis in the U.S. was the deal struck between banks and government for the 
provision of loans to unqualified mortgage borrows in exchange for relaxed banking 
regulation. The unique contribution of this chapter is that it brings together both 
qualitative evidence and a quantitative approach in order to establish a causal link 
between government policies and bank distress. 
Second, this chapter augments Russian economic history. Gerschenkron 
advanced a view that the state was the ‘agens movens of industrialisation’ 
(Gerschenkron, 1962, p. 20), or the primary driver of economic development, much 
responsible for the country’s economic outcomes. This chapter’s research supports 
Gerschenkron’s arguments, and at the same time questions Gregory’s (1991, 1994) 
revisionist view that the Russian state was not a vital player in the industrialisation of the 
1890s. Specifically, Gregory contends that, among other reasons, state expenditures on 
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industrial products, such as military hardware, were too small to have a meaningful 
impact on industrial growth. 
Third, this chapter adds to the literature studying the impact of bankers’ personal 
connections on bank performance. Existing literature has found that political interlocks 
can have both a negative (Duchin & Sosyura, 2012; Grossman & Imai, 2016) and 
positive impact (Braun & Raddatz, 2010; Acemoglu et al., 2016) on financial outcomes 
of banks. This chapter argues that a negative influence is very much a possibility. When 
it comes to interlocks with non-financial firms, this chapter’s research adds to the 
established view that this type of connections has mostly a negative impact in times of 
stress (Laeven, 2001; La Porta et al., 2003; Colvin, 2014; Colvin et al., 2015). Lastly, 
this study contributes to the scarcely-researched topic of personal ties among banks 
themselves being responsible for both bank profits (Fowler et al., 2014) and losses 
(Colvin et al., 2015). This chapter’s findings in this regard are indeterminate. One 
element that distinguishes this chapter is that identifies exactly the type of information 
that passed through interlocks to have the quantified effect. In contrast, nearly all 
academic articles on interlocks do not go beyond hypothesising why interlocks have the 
determined effect.2 
Fourth, this chapter contributes to the literature on the role of bank relationships 
with industry in economic development of the 19th century. Banks’ interlocks with 
companies brought little tangible benefits during German industrialisation (Fohlin, 
1999), yet were essential for economic development of New England (Lamoreaux, 
1996), and improved British firms’ access to credit in Sheffield (Newton, 1996). This 
chapter’s findings suggest that bank-industry connections played a significant role in the 
development of Russia’s heavy industry. 
2
 As an example of such papers, see Acemoglu et al. (2016). 
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This chapter builds its arguments in the following sequence. Section 2.2 provides 
the historical setting of the study. Section 2.3 outlines the proximate causes of the crisis. 
Section 2.4 quantifies the government’s role in the expansion of industrial production in 
the 1890s. Section 2.5 examines the information channel through which the government 
affected banks’ inclination to finance industry. Section 2.6 summarises the two other 
channels through which the government potentially influenced banks’ decisions. Section 
2.7 defines the empirical strategy and variables. Sections 2.8 and 2.9 provide empirical 
results. Section 2.10 concludes. 
2.2. Industrialisation in the 1890s 
In the 1880s, Russia’s share of world manufacturing production was far behind that of 
other major nations. Whereas the U.K.’s share was 26.6 per cent and France’s 8.6 per 
cent, Russia’s was only 3.4 per cent (League of Nations, 1945). In 1893, the newly-
appointed Finance Minister, Sergei Witte, introduced new economic policies aimed at 
rapid industrialisation. The goal was to catch up with the already industrialised countries 
in Europe and make Russia great again on the world economic, political, and military 
arena (Gindin, 1957). Witte believed a country based solely on agriculture was at the 
mercy of ‘a quite obvious, unsheltered exploitation of its productive forces’ (Gindin, 
1957, p. 154) by the already industrialized countries.3 In fact, the humiliating fiasco in 
the Crimean War of 1853-1956 and the diplomatic restrictions imposed on Russia at the 
Congress of Berlin in 1878 vividly showed that economic backwardness and military 
defeats are closely related (Crisp, 1976). 
Along with foreign investors, whose role is discussed in the next section, 39 
joint-stock commercial banks financed industrial growth. Banks supplied well over half 
3
 Author’s translation, as in all other instances of text translated from the Russian language. 
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of total industry financing, according to my estimates.4 Ten banks were headquartered in 
St. Petersburg, the capital city, where the government was located; five were based in 
Moscow, which was the centre of light industry; while the rest were operating from 
across the provinces, from present-day Poland to Siberia. Table A1 in Appendix 
provides a list of bank names and bank characteristics. 
Rapid industrialization was a success. Figure 1 shows that throughout the 1890s, 
745 public companies were established, as opposed to 216 firms in the prior decade.5  As 
a result, between 1893 and 1900, the value of output manufactured by heavy and light 
industry rose by 87 and 52 percent, respectively (Borodkin, 2011a, 2011c). By 1900, 
Russia produced 5.0 percent of global manufacturing output, which placed it close to 
France, the world’s fourth largest manufacturer (League of Nations, 1945). 
4
 I estimate that banks supplied some 61 percent of joint-stock company financing. Banks’ role in 
financing heavy industrial companies was likely greater still. See Appendix B1 for how I derive 
this percentage. For comparison, Bovykin (1967) estimates that banks supplied half of heavy 
industry finance. 
5
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Figure 1. Number of joint-stock companies established per year, 1890-1900
Sources: Dmitriev-Mamonov (1903).
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2.3. The proximate causes of the crisis 
Sound industrial growth of the 1890s was interrupted by the financial crisis of 1899-
1902, which was initiated by the reduction in foreign capital inflow into government 
bonds and securities of industrial enterprises. Beginning from 1899, the Russian 
government found it almost impossible to sell its debt on the Parisian market, which had 
been Russia’s primary source of external funding (Ministry of Finance, 1900-1907b).6 In 
fact, Gregory (2003) estimates that foreigners owned as much as 57 per cent of 
government debt in 1898. Starting from the same year, the rate of capital inflow to joint-
stock firms began to decelerate. If in 1899 foreign resources invested in corporate equity 
and debt securities increased by a rate of 35 per cent, from 563 million rubles the year 
prior, then in 1900 the rate of increase was 20 per cent, in 1901 it was seven per cent, 
and in 1902 a meagre one per cent (Ol, 1925).7 This contrasts markedly to the interest 
expressed by French, Belgian, and German investors in the years prior to crisis who 
found Russia to be a highly attractive opportunity. The net amount of foreign capital that 
entered the country soared by over 66 per cent between 1893 and 1900, from 2,951 to 
4,910 million rubles (Bovykin, 1984).8 
6
 A government bond of 159 million rubles was placed with French investors in May 1901 and 
another 182 million rubles in April 1902, together equivalent to 2.7 percent of Russia’s GNP in 
1902, but that did not make a big difference to national finances (Siegel, 2015). GNP is from 
Gregory (2003). 
7
 Gindin (1948), who had undertaken a critical assessment of Ol’s figures, concluded that his 
estimations were neither overstated nor understated for the period under examination. 
8
 The net flow of foreign capital of 1,959 million rubles between 1893 and 1900 was equivalent 
to approximately 208.6 million pounds and 10.6 percent of the nominal British GDP in 1900. 
Foreign exchange is calculated as the average rate on a three-month bill of exchange drawn from 
St. Petersburg on London between 1893 and 1900. Data on the rates is from Borodkin (2011b). 
GDP is from Thomas & Williamson (2018). 
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The decline in foreign capital inflow was unrelated to Russian industrial 
performance and was due to the shortage of capital in Europe, itself attributable to 
various economic and political factors. These factors ranged from rapid industrial 
development in Germany in the 1890s, which consumed large amounts of spare capital, 
to the Greco-Turkish War of 1897 and the Spanish-American War of 1898 that diverted 
funds from European money markets (Ministry of Finance, 1900a; Witte, 1898b). The 
scarcity of capital manifested itself in the rise of official interest rates across Europe as 
early as the summer of 1898. In a note to the Czar, the Finance Minister Sergei Witte 
mentioned that on 29 October 1898, German interest rates stood at 5.5 per cent, the level 
not seen since the Baring crisis of 1890 (Witte, 1898b). The fact that interest rates in 
Europe began rising six months prior to the beginning of the crisis in Russia suggests 
that the sudden stop in capital flows was due to purely exogenous factors.9 In October 
1899, the Second Boer War broke out, depriving Great Britain of access to considerable 
gold supplies in South Africa, which further exacerbated capital constrains on European 
money markets (Ministry of Finance, 1900a). 
As a consequence, from February 1899, the St. Petersburg stock exchange index 
began its three-year-long decline until the end of 1901, by which point the index would 
drop by 45.4 per cent.10 In 1901-02, heavy industry went into recession and its output 
9
 There was substantial opposition among top government officials to the inflow of foreign 
capital into Russian enterprises – although not government bonds – due to the fear that this would 
‘lead to the sale of our productive resources’ to foreigners (Gindin, 1959, 184). In a 17 March 
1899 Ministerial meeting presided by the Czar, it was decided that some new constrains would be 
welcomed to control the influx of foreign capital. With the coming of the crisis and the shifting of 
the focus on its resolution, no new administrative obstacles were formally introduced (Gindin, 
1958). This suggests that government decisions were not responsible for the decline in foreign 
capital. 
10
 Calculated based on data from Goetzmann et al. (n. d.a). 
32 
declined by 7.7 per cent.11 Three banks failed during the crisis and two banks shortly 
after, while other 35 banks were intensively assisted by the State Bank and survived 
(Russian State Historical Archive (RGIA), collection 587, inventory 33, file 101, page 
12-13). 
Other causes of the crisis were thought by contemporaries to be the reduction in 
state procurement of industrial products (Ozerov, 1905; Kanel, 1906), inadequate 
consumer demand for industry products, like the use of passenger trains, that could not 
substitute declining state procurement (State Comptroller, 1902), and weak corporate 
and stock exchange regulation (Witte, 1898a). Interestingly, the crisis was never 
attributed to inadequate banking regulation. Perhaps this was because Russia possessed 
one of the most stringent and advanced regulatory and supervisory banking frameworks 
in Europe, according to a comparative study conducted by the Ministry of Finance 
(Gindin, 1960).12 
2.4. Government industrial policy 
To determine the impact of state policies on bank performance, it is essential to identify 
the extent to which the government contributed both to the expansion of industrial 
production and bank financing of industry in the years leading up to the crisis. In the 
current section, the focus is on the state’s impact on industry. 
Industrialisation policies created a protectionist environment, which served as an 
impetus for firms to expand operations. A stimulating effect occurred for a number of 
11
 Calculated based on data from by Borodkin (2011a, 2011b). 
12
 For example, the average capital ratio of St. Petersburg banks was over 25 per cent before the 
crisis. Calculated based on data from Golubev (1898). For comparison, capital ratios of UK 
banks were about 12 per cent in 1900 (Sheppard, 2006). The exception was Germany, whose 
credit banks had a capital to assets ratio of 44 per cent in 1904 (Calomiris, 1995). 
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reasons, including state procurement of industrial products that took on a new level of 
intensity from 1893, protective tariffs on industrial imports, subsidies to key industries, 
including targeted loans from state coffers, the introduction of the gold standard in 1897 
for the purpose of attracting foreign capital to domestic enterprises, and the 
encouragement to form joint-stock companies (Gindin, 2007c). The push for rapid 
industrialization beginning 1893 is confirmed by a notable increase in the formation of 
joint-stock companies from that year onwards, as shown in Figure 1. 
In this policy arrangement, state procurement played a special stimulating role. 
Constantly rising state and private sector demand throughout the 1890s motivated 
industrialists to expand operations. In fact, in the general press, the crisis was first and 
foremost attributed to industrial over-expansion (Migulin, 1907). Perhaps no other 
evidence speaks in support for the occurrence of this powerful incentive than the one that 
comes from the Finance Minister himself. In a report for a special meeting, dating 10 
April 1903, the Finance Minister, looking back at the crisis, came to a realization that the 
true cause of calamities in manufacturing industry was the rapid railroad construction 
and industrial development initiated by the government (Gindin, 1996). Strong demand 
for manufacturing products outpaced supply for twelve consecutive years between 1887 
and 1899. Such a marketplace reality encouraged industrialists to constantly expand their 
production capacity. In 1900, ‘the law of the (continual) growth in consumption’ 
(Gindin, 1996, p. 137) was broken and supply outpaced demand for the first time. The 
overstretched financial position of factories, Witte added, put them at risk of an 
immediate failure (Gindin, 1996). 
Moreover, the prospect of obtaining state orders often led to overly optimistic 
decisions on the part of firms, especially in regards to the management of costs. Firms 
that did not have sufficient capacity to accommodate state contracts sought to enlarge 
operations for the sole purpose of attracting state orders. Such a strategy absorbed all of 
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firms’ profits from existing manufacturing and drove them into additional debt 
(Afanasiev, 1900; Gindin, 1996). A characteristic case of a purposeful expansion for the 
sake of securing a government contract was the growth and bankruptcy of a major 
mining enterprise that led to two out of three bank failures during the crisis.13 
In the midst of the crisis, in January 1901, the Ministry of Finance organized a 
special multi-day convention for the purpose of identifying the actual situation in 
industry. According to N. Avdakov, a spokesman for the Coalition of Southern Miners, 
the government set expectations for factories so high that industrialists had no other 
choice but to incur massive expenses for expansionary purposes. Of a similar opinion 
was K. Skalkovsky, a representative of metallurgical enterprises, who argued that 
factories had to be ‘built large’ (Gindin, 1996, p. 75) and then expand further if they did 
not want to miss an opportunity to obtain a state contract in the future. ‘The push for 
construction was given by the government itself’ (Gindin, 1996, p. 75), Skalkovsky 
concluded. 
What made state procurement particularly stimulating was the fact that the state 
was a dominant buyer. According to the estimates by V. Varzar, a leading economist of 
the time, pig iron, iron, steel, and products manufactured from these materials across the 
country were consumed in 1900 in the amount of 48 per cent by the government, 22 per 
cent by private enterprises, 14 per cent by the general population, and 16 per cent by 
unidentified parties (Ozerov, 1905). Note that the industries that extracted and employed 
in their production the aforementioned products comprised over 62 per cent of the total 
heavy industry output.14 Another piece of evidence comes from the Coalition of 
Southern Miners that, referring to their own data, indicated that the government’s share 
13
 Namely, the Alekseevski Mining and Joint-Stock Enterprise and the Kharkov Trade and the 
Ekaterynoslavsky commercial banks. 
14
 Calculated based on data from Borodkin (2011a, 2011b). 
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of procurement of the same products among Southern mining factories amounted to 47 
per cent of the total in 1899; whereas a representative from the Coalition of Polish 
Miners stated that in his region government demand amounted to a ‘mere’ 31 per cent of 
the aggregate (Gindin, 1996, p. 74). 
Qualitative records likewise point to the vast dependence of the private sector on 
state orders. The report of the State Comptroller (1902, p. 55) to the Czar for the year 
1901 stated that ‘(c)urrently, there is little doubt that the basis of the crisis was the 
artificial and excessive growth of the manufacturing industry in recent years, which had 
originated on the ground of the protectionist policy, large government orders, and 
speculation using cheap foreign capital’. In a memorandum to senior authorities, a 
director of the State Bank, V. Zhukovski, stressed that the coming of the crisis resulted 
in a battered financial situation of many companies, the fall in the value of industrial 
shares, tight credit conditions, and ‘the lack of government orders’ (Matveeva, 1987, p. 
52-53). 
Government procurement played not only a stimulating role in the 1890s, but it 
also contributed to the recession in industry over 1901-02 because the state could no 
longer sustain procurement on pre-crisis levels. At the above-mentioned January 1901 
convention, the spokesman for southern miners reported that the state procurement 
dropped to 40 per cent in 1900, from 47 per cent in 1899 (Gindin, 1996). Qualitative 
records likewise point to the decline in state procurement in later stages of the crisis 
(Gindin, 1996). The Economist, in its 29 June 1901 issue, reported that ‘while production 
rapidly increased, the ordinary consumptive demand steadily declined, and when the 
Government, owing to its financial embarrassments, had to curtail its railway building 
and its orders for material, the hot-house industries it had fostered collapsed, and with 
them the inflated market for industrial securities’ (p. 969). 
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2.5. Government information 
Having established the role of the government industry expansion, this section turns to 
describing the first channel through which the government affected banks’ inclination to 
finance industry – namely, information about industrialisation policies that banks 
gathered by means of personal connections, or interlocks. First, I identify which officials 
were most likely to possess privileged information. Second, I examine how banks acted 
on privileged information. Third, I document how banks leveraged their government 
connections. The evidence suggests that banks were greatly affected by the information 
they received. 
2.5.1. Government interlocks 
Existing literature suggests that firms, including banks, set up interlocks with 
government officials in order to benefit from their industry-specific or managerial 
expertise, to enhance the firm’s prestige, to gain access to preferential treatment, 
such as protection from domestic or foreign competitors, and to obtain preferential 
information on future government actions, such as state procurement plans or 
changes in regulation (Faccio, 2006; Grossman & Imai, 2016).
15
 The last two 
motives represent a form of rent-seeking that can distort market competition for the 
benefit of connected firms and their clients, thus impairing overall economic growth. 
Previous studies also suggest that banks establish interlocks with companies 
to reduce information asymmetries and to influence clients’ corporate strategy (La 
Porta et al., 2003). However, corporate connections do not come without risk. 
Corporate interlocks might develop a strong influence on a bank and convince it to 
finance a project that carries a bad credit risk. 
15
 For an extensive literature review on the role of interlocks, see Adams et al. (2010). 
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The first channel through which the Russian government affected banks’ 
decisions was through privileged information banks received on the future course of the 
industrialisation policies and/or on state procurement decisions. The way banks obtained 
such information was by establishing personal connections with government officials 
and corporate board members. 
Among the myriad of Russian government officials, some carried more weight 
and were better informed than others. The most central figure to the country’s 
development was the Finance Minister Sergei Witte, the man who was the architect of 
the industrialisation policies of the 1890s and the final decision-maker on procurement 
contracts, corporate subsidies, and other forms of economic support (Bovykin, 1967; 
Shepelev, 1981). One example highlighting the centrality of Witte’s position was his 
drive to consolidate power over the economic affairs of the nation in his own 
‘enlightened stewardship’ (Gindin, 1959, p. 123). Witte believed that that would ensure a 
successful orchestration of industrialisation (Gindin, 1959). Over the years, his power 
grew as the Ministry of Finance became a ‘super ministry’ (Solovyov, 2003, p. 165), 
whose reach expanded well beyond the responsibilities implied by its name, as in the 
case of acquiring an absolute control over the Ministry of Railways (Solovyov, 2003). 
Lastly, the historian Gindin (1996, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2007d) provided multiple 
examples of Witte’s omnipresent reach in economic affairs of the country. 
This evidence provides good reasons to believe that all major economic policy 
decisions emanated from Witte, and the majority of state procurement contracts passed 
through the Minister’s hands. From this, it is possible to infer that the top government 
officials who were in close and regular contact with Witte were in the best position to 
obtain privileged information. In addition to officials in close contact with Witte, top 
officials at the Ministry of Railways, Agriculture, Defence, and Maritime Affairs were in 
a good position to acquire privileged information. This was because these officials were 
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in charge of procuring from private sector companies for their respective ministries. The 
procured products were then used for state-sponsored railway construction, the operation 
of the timber industry, and the rearmament of the army and navy (Gindin, 2007a). But 
even then, prior to placing industrial orders, the ministers had to first petition the 
Ministry of Finance for fiscal resources by outlining their procurement plans (Machlai, 
2011). 
2.5.2. The effect of government information 
Based on the written correspondence between bankers and government officials and 
corporate board members, Bovykin (1967) documented multiple cases of banks 
obtaining and then acting on privileged information. Through privileged information 
banks learned that selected industrial companies represented low-risk and high-return 
opportunities. Selected industrial firms were low-risk because the government often 
signed multi-year procurement contracts (Gindin, 2007c), which created the perception 
that state procurement would continue indefinitely and at a constant level. Indeed, Figure 
2 shows that on the eve of the crisis, the bond risk premium of heavy industrial 
companies, both extractive and manufacturing, was as low as that of long-established 
and conservative light industrial companies, as represented by the textile industry. What 
is more, the risk premium of corporate securities was just one per cent above the safest 
government bonds. 
At the same time, selected industrial companies represented high-return 
opportunities because the government procured at above-market prices (Lyaschenko, 
1949; Gindin, 2007c). Indeed, data between 1893 and 1898 reveals that heavy (extractive 
and manufacturing) industries on average only slightly underperformed the most 
profitable light industry, the textiles, by 3.1 and 3.0 per cent respectively, as measured by 
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government orders were likely even more profitable. As a result, policies aimed at the 
development of heavy industry inadvertently motivated banks to delegate a higher share 
of their assets to heavy industry financing. Indeed, a government audit conducted amidst 
the crisis of one of the troubled banks revealed that ‘in its activities, the bank stepped out 
of the strict limits of its statute, placing significant sums of money in emerging industrial 
enterprises both through the acquisition of shares of such enterprises and opening of 
credit to them’ (Bovykin & Petrov, 1994, p. 105). In fact, over-lending and over-
investment in a particular sector or clients is a common cause of bank distress, as has 
been established in historical literature.16 
Furthermore, throughout the years, Witte’s reports on state revenues and 
expenditures emphasized the need for unabated industrialisation. In one such report 
dating 1897, Witte stated that given that the government ‘has followed the protectionist 











Figure 2. Monthly corporate bond risk premium by industry (in percent), 1898-1904
Notes: The corporate bond risk premium is the excess of current yield on corporate bonds of each of the three industries
over the current yield of the highest-rated government security, the four percent Russian government bond of 1894. Current
yield of each corporate bond is calculated based on price and coupon data of 37 individual bonds. Gaps in the series are due
no trades in those months. Industry yield is the average yield of traded bonds in every month weighted by the outstanding
amount of each bond.
Sources: Price and coupon data is from the Ministry of Finance (1900-1907a). The quantity of bonds outstanding is from
Dmitriev-Mamonov (1903).
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system with an unwavering rigor and consistency’ for some time already, the premature 
loosening of these policies would be ‘a large political mistake and a source of major 
shocks to the economic organism of the country’ (Ministry of Finance, 1896a, p. 14). 
Even at the beginning of the crisis, in the official industrialisation programme presented 
to the Czar, dating February 1899, Witte continued to stress the importance of 
uninterrupted industrialisation (Von Laue, 1954). 
In this information environment, it was natural for banks to expect the 
government to continue procuring even in a time of crisis. It might, thus, be argued that 
banks were more inclined to finance riskier heavy industry projects because of the 
expectation of industry support. In fact, this is exactly what happened during the crisis 
when the government orchestrated a massive bailout of industrial firms (Gindin, 1996). 
However, if banks engaged in riskier financing because of expected industry bailouts, 
that only points to state policies being responsible for bank losses in the crisis. Banks 
were not blameless either - they were too eager to make a profit and too blind to see that 
if foreign capital contracted, the state would not be able to procure on the same level. 
Witte’s continued emphasis on adhering as closely as possible to the existing 
course of action could also potentially explain why banks with well-informed 
connections did not see the coming of the crisis in industry. Politicians and corporate 
board members could have simply not realized how Witte’s promises might not 
materialize and hence did not advise their banking interlocks on an immediate 
disengagement from industry financing at the beginning of the crisis. 
As for the importance of interlocks between banks, existing literature 
suggests that personal ties between firms can result in adoption of the competitor’s 
corporate strategy, including alignment of investment and lending decisions 
(Connelly et al., 2011). In a time of crisis, banks with similar characteristics or 
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exposure to same sectors can experience greater distress due to information 
contagion effects (Helwege & Zhang, 2016). 
Banks in Russia seemed to mimic a corporate strategy of their neighbouring 
banks. Banks in St. Petersburg were known for lending to heavy industries, forming 
consortia for underwriting purposes, providing investors with trading services, and 
acting as bankers to the government, as in issuing and restructuring government debt 
(Lebedev, 2003).17 Meanwhile, banks in Moscow and in the provinces generally stayed 
away from this speculative corporate model, the adjective used by the more conservative 
Moscow bankers to describe their counterparts in St. Petersburg (Salomatina, 2004). 
Therefore, a corporate strategy chosen by banks with political and corporate interlocks 
could have passed onto banks with no such connections via personal ties between banks 
themselves. 
2.5.3. Leveraging government interlocks 
In return for underwriting services, banks were often compensated by the very securities 
they underwrote (Bovykin, 1967). Banks seemed to be happy with this arrangement as 
they often retained the securities on their books. This suggests that banks did not engage 
in the underwrite-to-distribute practice. It was also common for banks to extend loans 
collateralized by industrial securities issued by clients (Bovykin, 1967). This meant that 
banks kept the securities on their books for the duration of the loan. Moreover, 
individual board members and directors of some banks were compensated with corporate 
securities (Bovykin, 1967). This suggests that some bankers had personal skin-in-the-
game and genuinely believed in the soundness of their clients. In return for their 
17
 Bankers to the government also issued government-backed mortgage securities, carried out 
foreign exchange interventions on stock exchanges abroad, and helped to buy out shares of 
private railroad companies for nationalization purposes (Lebedev, 2003). 
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services, banks were also granted seats on corporate boards.  Sometimes the reverse 
occurred (Bovykin, 1967). However, given that bank board members held directorships 
and ownership stakes with multiple corporations, they are best regarded as bankers on 
the boards of corporations, not the other way around. 
As banks became financially and interpersonally intervened with companies, 
they began to leverage their government connections for the benefit of their corporate 
clients. Some banks directly petitioned ministries for procurement orders for their clients 
(Bovykin, 1967), in what could be deemed as rent-seeking. This could have resulted in 
the suboptimal redistribution of state orders. However, there is at least one reason to 
believe that banks’ petitions on their own could not have resulted in such a severe 
misallocation of procurement as to lead to the recession of 1901-02 in heavy industry. In 
the 1890s, industrial opportunities were abundant – 456 new joint-stock companies were 
established between 1893 and 1898 (Dmitriev-Mamonov, 1903). There was no need for 
a bank to mislead the government into procuring from a poorly-managed company just 
because it was the bank’s client. The bank could disinvest its holdings and then move on 
to better opportunities. In fact, Bovykin (1967) documented how banks consistently 
rejected unattractive investment and lending opportunities and sold unsuitable assets. 
2.6. Government banking policy 
This section refers the reader to Appendix B2, which examines the two other channels 
through which the government affected banks’ inclination to finance industry: (1) the 
government’s expectation of banks to finance industrial development, and (2) the State 
Bank’s policy towards the banking sector. The evidence suggests that these two channels 
played minor, if not negligible, role in affecting banks’ decisions. 
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2.7. Empirical strategy and variables 
Having established the role of government officials and corporate board members in 
banks’ decision-making in the 1890s, I turn to analyzing the impact of interlocks on bank 
performance during the crisis of 1899-1902. For that, I estimate OLS regression models, 
such that: 
Distressi = β0 + β1 (interlock variables) + β2 (bank-specific variables) + εi 
2.7.1. Dependent variables 
To quantify bank distress, I use two separate dependent variables. In the first instance, 
Distressi comes in the form of net losses banks sustained on investment portfolios over 
the entire crisis period, calculated as the ratio of net investment portfolio losses between 
1899 and 1902 to the average value of investment portfolio owned by the bank over the 
same time period. For the three banks that went bankrupt before the end of 1902, I 
calculate the denominator only for the years when the bank was still in operation. To 
perform these calculations, I hand-collected end-of-year investment portfolio holdings 
for the years 1899-1902 and net investment losses for the years 1899-1900 from The 
Consolidated Balance Sheets (Golubev, 1899-1902a), which I found in the Russian State 
Library. Net investment losses for the years 1901-02 were gathered from annual reports 
of individual banks, when available; otherwise, they were taken from The Directory of 
Corporations and Partnerships (Dmitriev-Mamonov, 1903).18 
In the second instance, Distressi takes the form of the percentage change in the 
bank share price from the maximum to the minimum level over 1899, the first year of the 
18
 Annual reports of the following banks were used: the Russian for Foreign Trade Bank, the St. 
Petersburg Discount and Loan Bank, the Moscow Discount Bank, the Volzhsko-Kamski, the St. 
Petersburg Muscovy, the St. Petersburg International, and the St. Petersburg Private commercial 
banks.  
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crisis. During this period, the St. Petersburg Stock Exchange experienced a rapid decline 
of 10.6 per cent out of 45.4 per cent total for the crisis (Goetzmann et al., n.d.a). I 
obtained bank share prices from the dataset constructed by Goetzmann et al. (n.d.b). See 
Appendix B3 for the reasons why these particular distress measures were chosen. 
2.7.2. Independent variables 
To capture the effect of government and corporate connections on bank performance, I 
add interlock variables to my models. I register two broad categories of interlocks: direct 
and indirect ones. First, I recognize a direct interlock when the same person holds office 
at two entities – that is, a bank and a government body or a bank and a company. This 
occurs only when first, middle, and last names of two individuals match. Second, I 
consider an indirect interlock when a board member at a bank is connected to his sibling, 
either in the government or at a company. This occurs when last and middle names of 
two individuals match.19 This is because in Russia, the father’s first name has 
customarily become the child’s middle name, the tradition that has been followed since 
the 18th century (King & Wilson, 2011; Lisbach & Meyer, 2013). Moreover, for two 
individuals to be identified as siblings, both individuals must have made great progress 
in their respective careers. After all, only a selected few became top government officials 
or corporate board members. Furthermore, a good portion of bankers’ last names were 
unique and of non-Russian descent, including such surnames as Nobel, Bark, Gromme, 
and Lego. 
Next, I establish five different types interlocks: two government, two corporate, 
and one banking. I consider an interlock with the government, when a member (direct 
interlock), or the member’s sibling (indirect interlock), on the board of directors or the 
19
 Another way an interlock could have been established was via a father-son connection. 
However, I find no such linkages. Women did not hold board positions at that time. 
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management committee of a bank is employed by a government entity – that is to say a 
state department, organization, or agency – through which he has a potential to gather 
preferential intelligence. To identify which government organizations to include in my 
dataset, I review all public entities that operated in Russia, as listed in Address-Calendar 
(1898). I keep nearly all entities except the ones whose employees were absolutely 
unrelated to the industrialisation process, as, for example, in the case of the Department 
of the Orthodox Confession. I gather names of officials employed by the state in 1898 
from Address-Calendar (1898) and names of board members employed by banks in 
1898 from Russian Banks (Golubev, 1899b). Note that I treat all government officials as 
equal, as to not differentiate between higher- and lower-ranked officials. Instead, I create 
a separate type of a government interlock, to which I turn next. 
Not all connections are equal in value. Access to government officials close to 
the epicentre of policy-making should be more beneficial to bankers than ties to officials 
who are further away from decision makers. With this in mind, I record an interlock with 
the Finance Minister’s circle of well-informed officials when there is a direct or indirect 
interlock between a bank board member and highest-ranked officials who are likely to be 
in close contact with the Minister of Finance on a regular basis. Namely, I include top 
officials at (1) the Ministry of Finance, the centre of policy-making on all national 
economic affairs (Raskin, 1998); (2) the Ministry of Railways, which was one of the 
largest buyers in the country (Solovyov, 2003); (3) the Ministry of Agriculture, Defence, 
and Maritime Affairs that procured from private sector companies; (4) the State Bank, 
which provided loans to industry and banks; (5) the State Nobles’ Land Bank, which 
extended loans to nobility, some of whom owned industrial enterprises; (6) the State 
Treasury, which was responsible for managing national finances (Raskin, 1998); (7) the 
Government Senate, the supreme supervisory body, in which Witte often appeared with 
reports (Raskin, 1998); and (8) the Council of the State, the supreme law-making body 
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(Raskin, 1998). As a result, only the most influential government bodies are included. 
The limited number of top officials at these agencies should insure that my interlock 
variables capture the passage of privileged information. 
As banks sustained losses related to industry, I track bank ties to the corporate 
world. I consider the occurrence of an interlock with non-financial firms when a bank 
board member either personally sits on the board or management committee of a non-
financial firm, or when that banker’s sibling serves in that role. I include in my dataset a 
full range of non-financial companies: heavy industrial, light industrial, and non-
industrial. Names of corporate board members are sourced from Statistics on Joint-Stock 
Businesses in Russia (Pushkin, 1897). The aim was to pick a data source that was not too 
close to the crisis in 1899, as it took time for ideas of newly-appointed corporate board 
members to materialize into bank strategy. Besides, corporate board members were 
elected for five-year periods (Rudjuk, 2005), indicating that the composition of the 
majority of boards was likely to remain unchanged between the end of 1896 and 1899. 
Note that I consider different types of corporate board members as equivalent: a 
chairman, a vice-chairman, and a regular member are counted as identical.20 
Not all corporate connections are equal in value. Since the state targeted the 
development of heavy industrial companies, bankers’ connections with such firms 
represent an alternative way of tracing the effect of state policies on bank performance. 
Hence, I record an interlock with heavy industrial firms when a board member at a bank 
is also a board member at a heavy industrial firm, or when the banker’s sibling serves in 
that role. I include in my dataset all firms operating in heavy industries, namely: 
extractive industries, such as oil and minerals; manufacturing industries that produced 
20
 I do not rank board members because the purpose of my analysis is to identify whether 
corporate connections mattered, rather than to pinpoint board members of which rank were more 
consequential than others. 
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end products like railroad tracks and ships; the chemical industry; the timber industry; 
and state-owned railroad companies.21 When there is doubt about whether a particular 
firm belonged to a heavy industry, I consult company descriptions provided by Dmitriev-
Mamonov (1903). To identify state-owned railroad companies, I refer to The Statistical 
Yearbook of the Ministry of Railways (Ministry of Railways, 1901). 
To see if banks mimicked a corporate strategy of their neighbouring banks, I 
document an interlock with banks when a board member at a bank is connected to a 
board member at another bank, either personally or via a sibling. To reiterate, I end up 
with five types of interlock variables: bank board members connected to government 
officials, to the Finance Minister’s circle, to all kinds of non-financial firms, to heavy 
industrial companies, and to other banks. 
What are these interlocks capturing? As discussed in the sections above, personal 
connections capture the passage of privileged information. If they were to register 
corruption, then we would expect to see little of bank distress. That is because, as 
discussed above, the suboptimal redistribution of state orders could not, on its own, have 
lead to the recession of 1901-02 in heavy industry. It would also be argued that omitted 
factors, such as banks’ poor oversight of industrial clients, are driving both the presence 
of interlocks and bank performance. However, the industrialization policies and the 
information that came with it occurred first, while any potentially omitted factors could 
only be the result of the formed information environment. 
My next step is to identify actual interlocks by matching banker names with the 
names of government officials and separately with those of corporate board members. I 
use a source code written specifically for this task. The matching process of 416 bankers, 
21
 State-owned railroad companies are included because some banks underwrote state-backed 
railroad bonds. Banks’ inability to find buyers for such bonds during the crisis forced them to 
keep the bonds on their books, thus impairing their performance. 
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3,378 corporate board members, and 7,596 government officials reveals that there were 
49 bankers with personal links to 63 officials and 142 bankers with personal ties to 418 
corporate board members. The matching also indicates that 74.2 per cent of all banker 
connections to the political and corporate world were arranged via a sibling, while the 
remaining 25.8 per cent were arranged via a direct interlock. 
As the final step, I sum the number of bank board members with connections of 
each type and use the total amounts in regression analysis. Note that if a particular 
banker is connected to multiple corporate board members, I count that as a single 
interlock of a particular type for that bank. For me to record ten bank board members 
with interlocks, all ten members must have one or more corporate ties. The same method 
is applied to bank connections with government officials. 
I also add bank-specific variables to my regressions to control for the 
heterogeneity among banks. These variables are based on December 1898 data, the 
moment when there was little expectation of the upcoming crisis in the minds of bankers, 
yet that was just two months before the beginning of the stock market downturn. My 
choice of these variables is as follows, with full descriptions located in Table 1: bank 
age, number of bank locations, leverage, liquidity, asset growth in the year prior to the 
crisis, and board size. I collect these variables from The Consolidated Balance Sheets 
(Golubev, 1898a), with the exception of bank age, which is gathered from Russian Banks 
(Golubev, 1899b). Lastly, Tables A2 and A3 in the Appendix provide correlation 
matrices for all variables. 
2.8. Empirical results 
To preview my results, I examine the distribution of interlocks among banks. 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































were more connected to industry than banks located in Moscow and in the provinces. St. 
Petersburg banks had 0.5 corporate ties per board member, followed by Moscow banks 
with 0.4 interlocks, and provincial banks with 0.2 contacts. The table also shows that St. 
Petersburg banks were the most connected group with heavy industry. Their 35 personal 
linkages resulted in the number of connections per board member being four times as 
dense as that of Moscow or provincial banks. Given that St. Petersburg banks sustained 
largest financial losses among the three banking groups, as is shown in the summary 
statistics in Table 2, their high interconnectedness with heavy industry implies that 
personal ties might have played a role in bank distress. 
At the same time, Moscow banks were most highly connected to government 
officials, with 0.3 connections per bank member. However, when it came to connections 
with the Finance Minister’s circle, St. Petersburg banks’ 15 connections represented 
connectivity per board member three times as dense as that of Moscow banks.22 Table 2 
also presents summary statistics on interlock and non-interlock variables for all banks. 
My core evidence is presented in Table 3, which reports the results of five 
regression models, with the only difference between each specification being the type of 
the interlock variable used. Note that these models incorporate both direct and indirect 
interlocks. Robust standard errors are used in all models. Model (1) shows that with each 
additional bank board member connected to a variety of government officials, both close 
to the Minister of Finance and not directly related to his circle, a bank experienced 1.1 
per cent of extra losses on its investment portfolio, though the result is not statistically 
significant at standard levels. Model (2) tests exclusively for bank board members 
connected to officials close to the Minister of Finance. The model reveals that with each 
22
 The proportion of banks with connections to the Finance Minister’s circle was 28 percent. For 
comparison, Grossman & Imai (2016) find that that the proportion of British banks connected to 
members of the Parliament was about 24 percent in 1900. 
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Table 2: Summary statistics
N mean median SD min max
39 0.06 0.03 0.09 0.00 0.41
10 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.00 0.41
5 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.08
Net investment losses (all banks)
Net investment losses (St. Petersburg banks)
Net investment losses (Moscow banks)
Net investment losses (Provintial banks) 24 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.22
26 -0.16 -0.16 0.11 -0.41 0.00
9 -0.23 -0.22 0.09 -0.41 -0.07
4 -0.21 -0.22 0.07 -0.27 -0.14
Share price (all banks)
Share price (St. Petersburg banks)
Share price (Moscow banks)
Share price (Provintial banks) 13 -0.09 -0.07 0.08 -0.29 0.00
36 0.16 0.10 0.17 0.00 0.73Net investment profits (all banks)
Net income (all banks) 35 0.08 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.14
39 9.86 10.13 1.32 6.84 12.06
39 21.82 26.00 9.70 1.00 34.00
39 7.64 4.00 8.93 1.00 30.00
39 0.59 0.61 0.16 0.09 0.81
39 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.17







Board size 39 10.33 9.00 5.46 3.00 25.00
39 1.26 0.00 2.12 0.00 9.00
39 0.56 0.00 1.12 0.00 5.00
39 3.62 3.00 3.47 0.00 12.00
39 1.41 1.00 1.90 0.00 8.00
Member connected to the government
Member connected to the Finance Minister’s circle
Member connected to non-financial firms
Member connected to heavy industrial firms
Member connected to banks 39 1.05 0.00 1.83 0.00 7.00
39 1.62 0.00 2.71 0.00 11.00
39 0.69 0.00 1.38 0.00 6.00
39 9.67 5.00 11.30 0.00 43.00
39 3.03 1.00 4.29 0.00 17.00
Interlocks with the government
Interlocks with the Finance Minister’s circle
Interlocks with non-financial firms
Interlocks with heavy industrial firms
Interlocks with banks 39 1.08 0.00 1.90 0.00 7.00
Share of board connected to the government 39 0.09 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.38
Share of board connected to the Finance Minister’s circle 39 0.04 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.27
Share of board connected to non-financial firms 39 0.33 0.35 0.26 0.00 1.00
39 0.12 0.09 0.15 0.00 0.56Share of board connected to heavy industrial firms
Share of board connected to banks 39 0.07 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.42
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additional interlock of this type, a bank sustained a much higher loss equal to 5.9 per 
cent of extra portfolio losses. 
The conclusion from these results is that the banks that had been influenced most 
by industrialisation policies via personal connections exposed themselves financially to 
heavy industrial companies and, as a result, experienced greater losses. Importantly, it is 
possible to conclude that the banks that sustained greater losses were the financiers of 
heavy industry because the value of heavy industrial equities declined by a substantially 
greater amount than that of light industrial companies.23 
Model (3) in Table 3 provides evidence on the presence of a bank board member 
connected to all kinds of non-financial firms resulting in 2.3 per cent of additional 
investment losses. Model (4) narrows the range of personal connections to bank board 
members connected specifically to heavy industrial companies and reveals that the 
presence of this type of interlock led to even greater distress, equal to 4.1 per cent of 
additional portfolio losses. This suggests a particularly distressful effect of personal ties 
to firms that were highly incentivized by the government to expand operations, namely 
heavy industrial firms. Notice that interlocks with the Finance Minister’s circle brought 
greater distress than connections with heavy industrial companies. A possible 
explanation for this result is that banks with connections to the Finance Minister’s circle 
were more inclined to invest in heavy industry as compared to banks with only heavy 
industry interlocks. 
23
 52 heavy industrial companies traded between the peak in February 1899 and the trough in 
December 1901 on the St. Petersburg Stock Exchange experienced an average and median stock 
price decline of 56.2 and 65.5 percent, respectively. Seven light industrial companies traded over 
the same period experienced an average and median stock price decline of 22.2 and 27.3 percent, 
respectively. When stocks were not traded between February 1899 and December 1901, the 
closest available stock price was used. Thinly-traded stocks and second and subsequent stock 
offerings are not counted. Calculated based on data from Goetzmann et al. (n.d.b). 
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Table 3: Net investment losses 1899-1902, OLS model
1 2 3 4 5
Member connected to the government 0.011
(0.015)
Member connected to the Finance Minister’s circle 0.059∗∗∗
(0.021)
Member connected to non-financial firms 0.023∗∗∗
(0.007)
Member connected to heavy industrial firms 0.041∗∗∗
(0.009)
Member connected to banks 0.013
(0.012)
Bank age 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Number of locations 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Leverage -0.057 0.061 -0.058 0.023 -0.045
(0.137) (0.105) (0.096) (0.076) (0.120)
Liquidity 0.641 0.086 0.548 0.010 0.619
(0.841) (0.427) (0.661) (0.377) (0.793)
Asset growth 0.080 0.072 0.088∗ 0.085∗ 0.069
(0.059) (0.049) (0.046) (0.047) (0.053)
Board size 0.002 -0.000 -0.005 -0.004 0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Constant 0.008 0.016 0.031 0.020 0.003
(0.055) (0.074) (0.045) (0.052) (0.052)
Observations 39 39 39 39 39
Adjusted R2 -0.019 0.335 0.359 0.519 -0.001
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 4: Bank share price percentage change 1899, OLS model
6 7 8 9 10
Member connected to the government -0.011
(0.010)
Member connected to the Finance Minister’s circle -0.031∗∗
(0.013)
Member connected to non-financial firms -0.014∗∗
(0.005)
Member connected to heavy industrial firms -0.021∗∗
(0.009)
Member connected to banks -0.026∗∗
Constant
(0.011)
-0.142∗∗∗ -0.136∗∗∗ -0.094∗∗∗ -0.118∗∗∗ -0.125∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.021) (0.031) (0.024) (0.024)
Observations 26 26 26 26 26
Adjusted R2 0.002 0.095 0.157 0.131 0.154
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Univariate model.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Univariate models (6) to (9) in Table 4 largely confirm the results discussed in 
models (1) to (4) by testing the impact of interlocks on another distress variable, namely 
the percentage change in the bank share price over the first year of the crisis.24 These 
models incorporate both direct and indirect interlocks. The models reveal that the 
presence of a bank board member connected to the Finance Minister’s circle and 
separately to heavy industrial companies translated to an additional reduction in the 
bank’s share price. 
Model (5) in Table 3 shows that the presence of a bank board member connected 
to competitor banks did not lead to statistically significant investment losses. However, 
model (10) in Table 4 displays that having a board member of this type lead to a 2.6 per 
cent extra decline in the bank’s stock price. These results suggest that further evidence is 
needed to make a fully conclusive statement on the role of banking connections. 
How distressful were industrial looses for bank performance? Official audits 
revealed that key banks were practically bankrupt or on the verge of collapse, and it was 
only due to the massive assistance on the part of the State Bank that the larger half of 
banking system did not fail (Bovykin, 1984). 
2.9. Robustness 
In models (11) to (15) in Appendix Table A5, I perform the first of my nine robustness 
checks. The models point that personal connections were also the conduit that allowed 
banks to make extra profits in the years leading up to the crisis. In particular, Model (12) 
portrays that having a bank board member with both direct and indirect connections to 
the Finance Minister’s circle resulted in 9.2 per cent of additional investment profits 
24
 Not all banks were publicly traded on the St. Petersburg stock exchange, and hence the limited 
sample size of 26. Henceforth, all models that use bank share price as the dependent variable are 
univariate. 
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between 1895 and 1898. Model (14) shows that being connected to heavy industrial 
firms brought rewards as well, equal to 6.5 per cent in portfolio outperformance. These 
were considerable additional revenues for a bank because during this same period the St. 
Petersburg Stock Exchange appreciated by a mere 6.9 per cent.25 
In models (16) to (20) in Appendix Table A6 and models (21) to (25) in Table 
A7, I perform the second of my seven robustness checks. These models use a different 
set of interlock variables, capturing only direct interlocks that occur when a bank board 
member himself holds office in the government or at a company. These models confirm 
the results of core models (1) through (10). 
In models (26) to (30) in Appendix Table A8 and models (31) to (35) in Table 
A9, I conduct the third robustness check using only indirect interlock variables that 
occur when a bank board member is connected to his sibling in the government or at a 
company. Model (27), which captures the impact on net investment losses, shows that 
the presence of an indirect interlock with the Finance Minister’s circle is not statistically 
significant. However, model (32), which records the impact on the bank share price, 
displays statistical significance for the same type of interlock. Therefore, the effect of 
connections with the Finance Minister’s circle is not fully conclusive. With this 
exception, models (26) to (35) validate the results of core models (1) through (10). 
Another nuance to note in these models is that the coefficients on indirect 
interlocks with non-financial and heavy industrial companies are higher than on direct 
interlocks. Intuitively, we would expect direct interlocks to bring more distress. One 
potential explanation for the opposite result is that direct interlocks were not the main 
decision-makers, while bank board members with indirect connections were. 
In models (36) to (40) in Appendix Table A10 and models (41) to (45) in Table 
A11, I perform the fourth robustness check. These models use yet another set of 
25
 Calculated based on data from Goetzmann et al. (n. d.). 
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interlock variables in the form of the share of bank board members with both direct and 
indirect connections out of the total number of board members at each bank. These 
models confirm the results of core models (1) through (10). 
In models (46) to (50) in Appendix Table A12 and models (51) to (55) in Table 
A13, I perform the fifth robustness check. These models use interlock variables in the 
form of the aggregate number of both direct and indirect connections at each bank. These 
models, likewise, support the results of core models (1) through (10). 
In models (56) to (60) in Appendix Table A14, I perform the sixth of my 
robustness checks by adding an interaction term between bank board members connected 
to the Finance Minister’s circle and heavy industrial companies. First, model (59) shows 
that the independent effect of an interlock with heavy industry, for the bank with no 
connections to the Finance Minister’s circle, is a net investment loss, just as expected. 
Second, model (57) reveals that the effect of an interlock with the Finance Minister’s 
circle, for the bank with no connections to heavy industry, is not statistically significant. 
This indicates that a bank had to have heavy industry connections in order to sustain 
investment losses. Third, the positive and statistically significant interaction term in 
model (57) suggests that the effect of having an interlock with heavy industry is 
strengthened by the presence of a connection with the Finance Minister’s circle. 
In models (61) and (62) in Appendix Table A14, I perform the seventh 
robustness check, in which I test for the presence of interlocks with both government and 
industry. In particular, model (62) reveals that with each additional bank board member 
simultaneously connected to the Finance Minister’s circle and heavy industrial 
companies, the bank experienced a 9.9 percent of extra investment losses. This loss is 
larger in magnitude than the one associated with an interlock with only the Finance 
Minister’s circle, as shown in model (2). 
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In models (63) to (67) in Appendix Table A15 and models (68) to (72) in Table 
A16, I perform the eighth robustness check using an alternative method to calculate my 
robust standard errors. I employ iteratively reweighted least squares, which assigns a 
weight to each observation. The results of these models confirm those of core models (1) 
through (10). Note that, following Abadie et al. (2017), I do not cluster standard errors 
because I am using the entire population of banks in the analysis. 
In models (73) to (77) in Appendix Table A17, I perform the ninth robustness 
check by running Tobit models in order to address censoring issues. Censoring issues 
arise due to the dependent variable, net investment losses, being censored at zero for 
banks that made net investment profits over the crisis period.26 These models also 
support the results of core models (1) through (10). 
2.10. Conclusions 
The main finding of this chapter is that the banks that experienced greater distress during 
a major financial crisis of 1899-1902 had more connections to government officials who 
were close to the epicentre of policy marking as well as more connections to companies 
that had been highly stimulated by industrialisation policies to expand production. These 
findings indicate a negative effect of national development policies on bank performance 
following Russia’s rapid economic growth in the 1890s. 
The findings of this chapter suggest that it is not only banking regulation that can 
alter banks’ behaviour, but also other policy-conceived incentives. In industrialising 
Russia, it was policies targeted at the development of the real economy that enticed 
banks to financially expose themselves to new technology companies. These badly 
designed incentives culminated in disastrous bank performance when heavy industry 
26
 See Appendix B2 for the reasons why net investment losses were chosen as a dependent 
variable. 
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experienced a slowdown. In the end, even the possession of a stringent regulatory and 
supervisory banking framework did not safeguard banks from near failure. 
Put differently, during the crisis, sound investment and lending opportunities 
turned out to be not as safe as market participants, bankers, and government officials had 
believed them to be prior to the crisis. History offers multiple examples of similar cases. 
What this chapter has attempted to show is that the government itself can point to 
seemingly secure and low-risk opportunities that eventually turn out to be poor and 
costly decisions for banks. 
The findings also suggest that it is worthwhile to be aware of potential political 
ramifications of economic development policies. The financial crisis aggravated the 
already poor working and living conditions among ordinary workers, contributing to the 
propagation of labour strikes (Gefter, 1955; Gindin, 1950). The First Russian Revolution 
of 1905, which began just two and a half years after the conclusion of the crisis, was 




Table A1: List of banks
Bank name Headquarters Total assets Branches Bank age





St.Petersburg International Commercial Bank
Russian for Foreign Trade Bank
Russo-Asian Bank




St. Petersburg 73,734 2 29
Russian for Trade and Commerce Commercial Bank St. Petersburg 67,437 17 8
































St.Petersburg Private Commercial Bank
St.Petersburg-Azovcky Commercial Bank
St.Petersburg Muscovy Commercial Bank
Credit Lyonnais
Moscow Merchant Bank





Commercial Bank in Warsaw
Siberian Trade Bank
Riga Commercial Bank




Vilnius Private Commercial Bank






Nizhny Novgorod Merchant Bank
Kazan Merchant Bank
Commercial Bank in Kostroma
Lodz Merchant Bank
Ekaterynoslavsky Commercial Bank
Commercial Bank in Bialystok
Rostov-on-Don Merchant Bank
Baltic Commerce and Industry Bank
































The provinces 932 1 17
Notes: sorted by location of headquarters and then by total assets. Total assets are in thousands of rubles.
Sources: Golubev (1898a, 1899b)
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Table A2: Correlation of outcome and bank-specific predictor variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
(1) Net investment losses 1.00
(2) Share price -0.46∗∗ 1.00
(3) Net investment profits 0.72∗∗∗ -0.41∗∗ 1.00
(4) Bank size 0.47∗∗ -0.50∗∗ 0.37∗ 1.00
0.02 0.31 0.20 -0.05 1.00
0.01 -0.29 -0.11 0.60∗∗∗ -0.06 1.00
0.06 0.13 0.18 0.31 0.10 0.06 1.00
0.26 0.07 -0.02 0.22 -0.26 0.20 -0.07 1.00
-0.02 0.07 -0.02 -0.37∗ 0.07 0.01 -0.43∗∗ -0.22 1.00
(5) Bank age




(10) Board size 0.34 0.00 0.03 0.44∗∗ 0.12 0.18 0.22 0.08 -0.08 1.00
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table A3: Correlation of interlock predictor variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(1) Member connected to the government 1.00
(2) Member connected to the Finance Minister’s circle 0.61∗∗∗ 1.00
(3) Member connected to non-financial firms 0.66∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗ 1.00
0.42∗∗∗ 0.66∗∗∗ 0.81∗∗∗ 1.00(4) Member connected to heavy industrial firms
(5) Member connected to banks 0.70∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.65∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗ 1.00

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A5: Net investment profits 1895-1898,  O LS model
11 12 13 14 15
Member connected to the government 0.020
(0.019)
Member connected to the Finance Minister’s circle 0.092∗∗
(0.041)
Member connected to non-financial firms 0.047∗∗∗
(0.014)
Member connected to heavy industrial firms 0.065∗∗∗
(0.020)
Member connected to banks 0.021
(0.016)
Baseline controls X X X X X
Constant 0.158 0.179∗ 0.178∗ 0.133 0.153
(0.107) (0.104) (0.091) (0.102) (0.099)
Observations 36 36 36 36 36
Adjusted R2 -0.125 0.110 0.317 0.256 -0.120
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Baseline controls are bank age, number of locations, asset growth, and board size.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A6: Net investment losses 1899-1902, OLS model
16 17 18 19 20
Member connected to the government (direct interlock) 0.014
(0.019)
Member connected to the Finance Minister’s circle (direct interlock) 0.085∗∗
(0.036)
Member connected to non-financial firms (direct interlock) 0.020∗∗∗
(0.007)
Member connected to heavy industrial firms (direct interlock) 0.043∗∗∗
(0.011)
Member connected to banks (direct interlock) 0.004
(0.011)
Baseline controls X X X X X
Constant 0.003 0.002 0.033 0.035 -0.008
(0.057) (0.072) (0.053) (0.051) (0.057)
Observations 39 39 39 39 39
Adjusted R2 -0.026 0.274 0.231 0.426 -0.048
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Baseline controls are bank age, number of locations, leverage, liquidity, asset growth, board size
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table A7: Bank share price percentage change 1899, OLS model
21 22 23 24 25
Member connected to the government (direct interlock) -0.013
(0.016)
Member connected to the Finance Minister’s circle (direct interlock) -0.041
(0.028)
Member connected to non-financial firms (direct interlock) -0.013∗∗
(0.005)
Member connected to heavy industrial firms (direct interlock) -0.022∗∗
(0.010)
Member connected to banks (direct interlock) -0.024∗
Constant
(0.012)
-0.147∗∗∗ -0.142∗∗∗ -0.104∗∗∗ -0.122∗∗∗ -0.136∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.024) (0.029) (0.025) (0.025)
Observations 26 26 26 26 26
Adjusted R2 -0.020 0.036 0.108 0.097 0.083
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Univariate model.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A8: Net investment losses 1899-1902, OLS model
26 27 28 29 30
Member connected to the government (indirect interlock) 0.019
(0.036)
Member connected to the Finance Minister’s circle (indirect interlock) 0.065
(0.042)
Member connected to non-financial firms (indirect interlock) 0.050∗
(0.025)
Member connected to heavy industrial firms (indirect interlock) 0.080∗∗
(0.035)
Member connected to banks (indirect interlock) 0.087∗∗
(0.038)
Baseline controls X X X X X
Constant -0.005 -0.017 -0.027 -0.036 0.003
(0.058) (0.075) (0.052) (0.069) (0.048)
Observations 39 39 39 39 39
Adjusted R2 -0.032 0.113 0.158 0.190 0.224
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Baseline controls are bank age, number of locations, leverage, liquidity, asset growth, and board size.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table A9: Bank share price percentage change 1899, OLS model
31 32 33 34 35
Member connected to the government (indirect interlock) -0.033
(0.022)
Member connected to the Finance Minister’s circle (indirect interlock) -0.058∗∗
(0.023)
Member connected to non-financial firms (indirect interlock) -0.042∗
(0.023)
Member connected to heavy industrial firms (indirect interlock) -0.058
(0.037)
Member connected to banks (indirect interlock) -0.081∗∗
Constant
(0.030)
-0.141∗∗∗ -0.140∗∗∗ -0.132∗∗∗ -0.140∗∗∗ -0.127∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.020) (0.023) (0.021) (0.021)
Observations 26 26 26 26 26
Adjusted R2 0.028 0.103 0.094 0.078 0.158
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Univariate model.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A10: Net investment losses 1899-1902, OLS model
36 37 38 39 40
Share of board connected to the government 0.211
(0.195)
Share of board connected to the Finance Minister’s circle 0.545∗
(0.282)
Share of board connected to non-financial firms 0.184∗∗∗
(0.047)
Share of board connected to heavy industrial firms 0.371∗∗∗
(0.089)
Share of board connected to banks 0.251
(0.192)
Baseline controls X X X X X
Constant -0.016 -0.045 -0.051 -0.035 -0.015
(0.072) (0.083) (0.055) (0.062) (0.058)
Observations 39 39 39 39 39
Adjusted R2 0.010 0.189 0.272 0.369 0.049
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Baseline controls are bank age, number of locations, leverage, liquidity, asset growth,
and board size.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table A11: Bank share price percentage change 1899, OLS model
41 42 43 44 45
Share of board connected to the government -0.257
(0.171)
Share of board connected to the Finance Minister’s circle -0.531∗∗∗
(0.171)
Share of board connected to non-financial firms -0.191∗∗∗
(0.066)
Share of board connected to heavy industrial firms -0.294∗∗
(0.128)
Share of board connected to banks -0.202
Constant
(0.129)
-0.132∗∗∗ -0.129∗∗∗ -0.078∗∗ -0.109∗∗∗ -0.137∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.022) (0.030) (0.027) (0.028)
Observations 26 26 26 26 26
Adjusted R2 0.038 0.143 0.172 0.155 0.020
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Univariate model.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A12: Net investment losses 1899-1902, OLS model
46 47 48 49 50
Interlocks with the government 0.005
(0.010)
Interlocks with the Finance Minister’s circle 0.035∗
(0.020)
Interlocks with non-financial firms 0.008∗∗∗
(0.002)
Interlocks with heavy industrial firms 0.017∗∗∗
(0.005)
Interlocks with banks 0.015
(0.013)
Baseline controls X X X X X
Constant -0.005 -0.007 0.031 0.031 0.008
(0.058) (0.080) (0.039) (0.051) (0.050)
Observations 39 39 39 39 39
Adjusted R2 -0.038 0.175 0.491 0.382 0.028
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Baseline controls are bank age, number of locations, leverage, liquidity,
asset growth, and board size.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table A13: Bank share price percentage change 1899, OLS model
51 52 53 54 55
Interlocks with the government -0.009
(0.009)
Interlocks with the Finance Minister’s circle -0.021∗
(0.012)
Interlocks with non-financial firms -0.004∗∗∗
(0.001)
Interlocks with heavy industrial firms -0.011∗∗∗
(0.004)
Interlocks with banks -0.025∗∗
Constant
(0.009)
-0.143∗∗∗ -0.141∗∗∗ -0.103∗∗∗ -0.113∗∗∗ -0.126∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.022) (0.027) (0.023) (0.024)
Observations 26 26 26 26 26
Adjusted R2 -0.001 0.044 0.195 0.194 0.156
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Univariate model.























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A15: Net investment losses 1899-1902, OLS model
63 64 65 66 67
Member connected to the government -0.013∗∗
(0.005)
Member connected to the Finance Minister’s circle 0.063∗∗∗
(0.016)
Member connected to non-financial firms 0.008∗∗
(0.003)
Member connected to heavy industrial firms 0.018∗∗∗
(0.004)
Member connected to banks -0.002
(0.006)
Baseline controls X X X X X
Constant 0.026 0.014 0.046 0.003 0.041
(0.032) (0.064) (0.033) (0.030) (0.038)
Observations 39 39 39 39 39
Adjusted R2 0.276 0.286 0.171 0.375 0.072
Robust standard errors in parentheses, calculated using iteratively reweighted least squares.
Baseline controls are bank age, number of locations, leverage, liquidity, asset growth, and board size.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table A16: Bank share price percentage change 1899, OLS model
68 69 70 71 72
Member connected to the government -0.012
(0.012)
Member connected to the Finance Minister’s circle -0.032∗
(0.017)
Member connected to non-financial firms -0.014∗∗
(0.006)
Member connected to heavy industrial firms -0.021∗
(0.010)
Member connected to banks -0.030∗∗
Constant
(0.011)
-0.139∗∗∗ -0.132∗∗∗ -0.090∗∗ -0.115∗∗∗ -0.113∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.024) (0.036) (0.029) (0.023)
Observations 26 26 26 26 26
Adjusted R2 0.002 0.088 0.132 0.112 0.207
Robust standard errors in parentheses, calculated using iteratively reweighted least squares. Univariate model.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A17: Net investment losses 1899-1902, Tobit model
73 74 75 76 77
Member connected to the government 0.010
(0.016)
Member connected to the Finance Minister’s circle 0.061∗∗∗
(0.021)
Member connected to non-financial firms 0.031∗∗∗
(0.008)
Member connected to heavy industrial firms 0.046∗∗∗
(0.009)
Member connected to banks 0.015
(0.013)
Baseline contols X X X X X
Constant -0.028 -0.001 0.012 0.002 -0.034
(0.078) (0.087) (0.058) (0.067) (0.073)
Observations 39 39 39 39 39
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Baseline controls are bank age, number of locations, leverage, liquidity, asset
growth, and board size. Dependent variable is zero for banks that made net investment profits over 1899-1902.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Appendix 2B 
B1. Bank lending to industry 
I calculate bank financing to joint-stock companies as a ratio of bank financing to all 
types of joint-stock companies, industrial and non-industrial, divided by the total amount 
of financing obtained by these companies by means of domestic and foreign banks, the 
State Bank, and company founders. 
The calculation is based on the following figures. (1) 1,707 million rubles worth 
of corporate equity and bond securities were sold on domestic stock exchanges through 
Russian banks by the end of 1899 (Bovykin, 1894). (2) 911 million rubles worth of 
corporate equity and bond securities were sold on foreign stock exchanges through 
foreign banks by the end of 1899, with Russian banks facilitating and taking part in the 
placement of many of these securities (Bovykin, 1894). For the purpose of keeping the 
calculation as conservative as possible, I assume that none of these securities were 
placed with the help of Russian banks, which is a large understatement. (3) Russian 
banks’ credit to all enterprises amounted 738 million rubles at the end of 1898, which is 
computed as the sum of bills discounted and call and term loans extended by banks 
(Golubev, 1898b). (4) The State Bank’s credit to all enterprises amounted to 358 million 
rubles at the end of 1898, which is computed as the sum of the sum of bills discounted 
and rediscounted, call and term loans provided, and expenses made on the account of the 
Treasury (State Bank, 1899; RGIA, 587, 33, 98). (5) Foreign banks made loans to 
foreign companies operating in Russia. These amounts are not known and therefore 
assumed to be zero. These were likely not large in comparison to other industry 
financing because there were only 115 foreign-owned companies in operation in 1899, as 
compared to nearly 900 domestically-owned firms (Dmitriev-Mamonov, 1903). (6) 
Some of companies’ initial capital stock was paid by company founders. These amounts 
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are not known, but are assumed to be 10 per cent of the total value of domestic and 
foreign equity and bond securities, or 262 million rubles. 
B2. Government banking policy 
B2.1. Government expectations 
Given that it was paramount for Russia to industrialise, it is likely that the government 
expected the banking sector to finance industrial development. This was the second 
channel of government influence. However, there are several reasons to believe that the 
government’s direct influence, assuming that it was indeed present, likely had a minimal 
impact on individual banks’ lending and investment decisions. 
The following studies point that this influence was no more than an expectation, 
and surely not a requirement, because authorities never explicitly instructed banks how 
to conduct their business and what sectors or individual companies to finance. A detailed 
study of financing deals of the St. Petersburg International Commercial Bank, a key 
banker to the government, found no evidence of the bank being exploited as an 
instrument of the state (Lebedev, 2003). Even Witte’s closest alliance in the banking 
world, banker А. Rothstein from the aforementioned bank, dealt with the Minister on 
most competitive terms, rather than as a subordinate, when negotiating compensation for 
his bank for the placement of government bonds (Lebedev, 2003). 
It is still possible that the government’s expectation carried a considerable 
weight in affecting banks’ decisions due to the fact that the Ministry of Finance was both 
banks’ regulator and supervisor. For example, the ministry could decline a bank’s 
petition to open a new branch or deprive a bank of its securities trading license by 
modifying its statute. This in effect would turn a non-invasive expectation into a 
powerful requirement. To address this issue, I examined banks’ statutes between 1895 
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and 1898 and found that that no statute was curtailed.27 There is also no indication based 
on an archival study of the ministry’s policies towards banks that the ministry abused its 
regulatory power (Gindin, 1960). 
It is also possible that the government had more leverage on the decisions of a 
small number of banks that were bankers to the government because these banks had 
lucrative government business to lose had they not fulfilled the expectation. I conclude 
that the government’s expectation likely did have a meaningful impact on such banks.28 
However, given that heavy industrial firms were highly profitable and banks’ 
profitability was never at an immediate risk, the question on how to balance industry 
financing without aggravating the relationship with authorities was probably not an issue 
that these bankers had to seriously deal with. As for the rest of banks, they were not 
bankers to the government, and thus they did not risk losing lucrative government 
business. 
B2.2. The State Bank’s policy 
The third channel through which the government affected banks’ decisions was the 
protectionist policy of the State Bank towards banks. I argue that this policy, too, had a 
minimal impact on inducing banks to finance industry. 
It is known that the State Bank was highly protective of banks in times of stress 
ever since the first bank failure in 1875 (Gindin, 1960). Only nine banks were liquidated 
since the establishment of the first commercial bank in 1864 and the crisis of 1899-1902 
(Gindin, 1960). Keeping banks stable was important for another reason: prior to the 
crisis, banks supplied well over half of total industry financing. Modern economists 
27
 Banks’ statutes are from the Complete Collection of Laws (1899a, 1899b, 1900, 1901). 
28
 The extent to which each bank provided services to the government is not known, and 
therefore it is not possible to control for this factor in regressions. 
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point out that the banks that expect to receive a bailout tend to increase their risk-taking 
activities (Stern & Feldman, 2004). 
If Russian banks were indeed counting on a bailout, then we should expect to see 
banks hastily extend new loans in the first months of the crisis in an attempt to tie 
themselves to industrial companies that were so important for industrialisation. To test 
whether such practice took place, I track the change in bank loans that were most 
indicative of heavy industry financing.29 I find that the eight banks that were most likely 
to be bailed out by the State Bank, reduced their lending by 27 per cent on average 
between January and December 1899.30 This suggests that these banks did not engage in 
last minute gambling for resurrection and, therefore, had not been counting on a bailout. 
Furthermore, even in non-crisis times, the State Bank provided credit to nearly 
all banks and rediscounted their bills in order to facilitate them in the role of credit 
suppliers to the economy (Gindin, 1960). Thus, it is possible that the banks receiving 
greater amount of financial assistance from the State Bank on a constant basis were more 
inclined to engage in industry financing. To test whether such practice took place, I 
examine the allocation of State Bank loans among banks. In 1898, such loans amounted 
to only 6.1 per cent of banks’ lending to the economy.31 If these loans were evenly 
distributed among banks, then the effect of the State Bank can be considered 
insubstantial. I estimate that the majority of the State Bank’s assistance went to banks in 
29
 Namely, I calculate the change in term loans backed by corporate securities and call loans 
backed by government and corporate securities. Loan quantities are taken from Golubev (1898). 
30
 I consider the banks that sustained ten per cent or greater investment portfolio losses over the 
crisis to be most likely bailed out. 
31
 Bank credit data is from Golubev (1898). The State Bank’s loans to banks are from the State 
Bank (1899). 
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the provinces.32 This suggests that the impact of the State Bank’s lending programmes 
was not that material because otherwise we would see provincial banks incur large losses 
during the crisis, but only four out of 25 provincial banks experienced sizable distress. 
B3. The choice of dependent variables 
I have chosen net investment losses and bank share price as my distress measures for 
four reasons. First, given that both measures were determined by stock market 
participants, these measures were least affected by banks’ practice of fraudulently 
understating losses on income statements (Bovykin, 1984). Although banks did tend to 
overestimate their investment assets (Lebedev, 2003), there was a mandatory 
requirement to mark investment portfolios to market on an annual basis.33 This mark-to-
market requirement forced banks to sooner or later document investment losses during 
the three-year-long stock market downturn. 
Second, net investment losses capture the reintermediation of collateral onto 
banks’ balance sheets throughout the crisis as heavy industrial companies were 
defaulting on their loans to banks. As a result of this reintermediation, banks’ portfolio 
holdings increased by an estimated 55 per cent between January and December 1899 
alone.34 Indeed, an annual report of the St. Petersburg International Commercial Bank 
(1901) documented the occurrence of this takeover of collateral. This massive 
32
 As of December 1898, out of 46.3 million rubles of total assistance to banks, 10.8 million was 
distributed by the State Bank’s St. Petersburg office (State Bank, 1899), which almost 
exclusively assisted banks based in St. Petersburg and Moscow (RGIA, 588, 1, 247; 588, 1, 277; 
588, 1, 593), and 35.5 million was given out by Moscow and provincial offices, which lent to 
banks based in Moscow and across the country. 
33
 The statute of each individual bank specified the annual mark-to-market requirement. 
34
 Own estimation, calculated as the increase in corporate securities on banks’ balance sheets, in a 
rapidly and constantly declining securities market. 
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reintermediation was one of the primary reasons why banks sustained heavy losses. 
Thus, by using net investment losses as a dependent variable, I am able to capture banks’ 
involvement in heavy industry financing – exactly the type of data that would have been 
ideal for conducting analysis. 
Third, both measures of distress were less affected by the substantial anti-crisis 
assistance provided by the State Bank to banks, as compared to other distress measures, 
such as net income. In particular, the share price variable was likely least affected 
because a state-funded investment fund, introduced to support the value of banking and 
industrial shares, began the acquisition of shares mainly in 1900, that is after the period 
over which the variable is calculated.35 
Fourth, net investment losses, which are censored at zero for banks that made a 
net profit, are preferable over net investment profits, which would not be censored at 
zero. From archival evidence we known that some banks deemed it simply inappropriate 
to finance heavy industry and made net investment profits over the crisis, despite having 
an above-average number of board members connected to the government and the 
Finance Minister’s circle (Gindin, 1958; Gindin, 1960).36 Therefore, using net profits in 
regression analysis would not capture the true relationship between the presence of 
interlocks and bank distress. 
35
 Although the investment fund was established as early as October 1899, it appears that it began 
acquiring large bundles of shares only in 1900. I determine this by using Bugrov’s (2003) data on 
the composition of the fund’s portfolio in February 1901 and the price for which the shares were 
acquired by the fund. I then match this price with the actual market price, drawn from 
Goetzmann et al. (n.d.b), to identify the month and year when the acquisitions were likely made. 
This reveals that the fund bought shares of 20 companies at some point in 1900 or later and of 
three companies in 1900 or possibly in 1899. 
36





‘All possible methods’: 
saving the Russian financial system in the 1899-1902 crisis 
3.1. Introduction 
The monetary policy actions of the Federal Reserve during and after the financial crisis 
of 2007-09 have generated a vast debate on the appropriate ways for a central bank to 
allay a financial turmoil. One side has argued for limiting the Federal Reserve’s toolkit 
to a classical lender of last resort, asserting that the Fed’s ad hoc and interventionist 
actions were responsible for the severity of the crisis (Taylor, 2014). Opponents have 
urged for a more activist central bank policy, involving a multitude of tools at the Fed’s 
disposal (Bernanke, 2015). Given the presence of strong arguments on both sides of the 
debate, some economists have called for more research on this issue (Taylor, 2014). 
In this chapter, I examine the response by the monetary authorities to a systemic 
financial crisis that took place in Russia between 1899 and 1902. Using hand-collected 
financial statements of the State Bank of Russia and archival records on its policy 
decisions, I analyze the rescue operations and their effects on the financial system and 
broader economy. In particular, I quantify the extent of each policy type employed by 
the State Bank and then review in detail individual policy measures, their evolution 
throughout the crisis, and the State Bank’s reasons behind the usage of each measure. 
Given the fact that the State Bank went beyond the classical lender of last resort 
prescriptions, I also examine the way the State Bank dealt with the potential moral 
hazard arising from its actions. 
Over one century before the rescue of the financial system in 2007-09, the State 
Bank implemented a multifaceted approach in containing the crisis. The crisis resolution 
involved lender of last resort operations to financial institutions, acquisition of securities 
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from investors, lending to non-financial institutions, bailouts of financial firms, and 
provision of liquidity to personal stock investors. I am unaware of any other instance 
when this variety of rescue operations was put into effect other than during the latest 
global financial crisis. Thus, it is worthwhile to compare the State Bank’s response to 
that of the Federal Reserve’s, rather than to contemporary crises.37 What makes the 
comparison more valuable is that, like the 2007-09 financial crisis, the Russian financial 
crisis was characterized by a crisis of confidence in market-traded securities issued by 
the private sector, a systemic shortage of both funding and market liquidity, and a highly 
interconnected banking system. 
I find that the State Bank’s multifaceted approach was successful in preserving 
price, employment, and financial stability. The evidence also suggests that the State 
Bank’s crisis response is identical to the types of policies employed by the Federal 
Reserve over the recent financial crisis, as compared in detail later. These findings 
support the proponents of a more activist and multisided central bank approach to crisis 
management. 
Secondly, I find that to mitigate the spread of moral hazard, the State Bank 
resorted to constructive ambiguity by allowing five banks, which represented 12 per cent 
of the banking system’s assets, to fail during and shortly after the crisis. However, large 
banks were allowed to go bankrupt only towards the end of, or after, the crisis. 
The findings of this chapter add to two strands of literature. First, this chapter 
augments the literature debating the appropriate methods for central banks to mitigate 
financial crises. The theoretical literature on how to best contain a crisis extends back to 
Thornton’s writings in 1802 and Bagehot’s dictum in 1873, and has been rapidly 
37
 For example, during the Barings crisis of 1890, the Bank of England created a guarantee fund 
to bail out the troubled Barings Bank. This avoided the unfolding of a crisis (Turner, 2014). 
During the Norwegian crisis of 1899, the Norges Bank provided liquidity to solvent banks and 
assisted with orderly liquidation of insolvent banks (Gerdrup, 2003). 
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growing recently (BIS, 2014). The activist central bank policy undertaken in the latest 
financial crisis has been questioned by some economists. There have been strong calls 
for the return to the Bagehot’s (1873) style lender of last response to a crisis (Taylor, 
2014). The tangible consequences of these calls have been the restriction of the Federal 
Reserve’s tools to combat future crises. For example, the Dodd-Frank Act limited the 
Fed’s ability to conduct bailouts of individual financial institutions. On the other hand, 
there is a growing empirical literature on the benefits of lender of last resort programs 
that go beyond the classical prescription (Acharya et al., 2017; Del Negro et al., 2017) 
and unconventional facilities, such as quantitative easing (Belke et al., 2017), lending to 
non-financial institutions (Campbell et al., 2011), and bailouts (Bianchi, 2016). This 
chapter adds a historical perspective to this debate by documenting the effect of a unique 
crisis response that involved all of the aforementioned programmes, and thus supports 
the views of those arguing for a more interventionist response to a crisis. 
Second, this chapter adds to a small literature documenting real-world cases of 
central bank response to major banking crises. Major banking crises are different from 
minor occurrences because they have a significant negative impact on the broader 
economy due to the disruption in credit supply (Diamond & Dybvig, 1983). A historical 
series of major banking crises have been created only for the U.S. and the U.K., with a 
total of 14 systemic episodes identified up to the 1930s (Jalil, 2015; Kenny et al., 2017). 
Well-documented crisis responses are available only for some of these episodes. This 
chapter thus supplements the very limited knowledge base on how to successfully 
contain a major crisis. 
This chapter builds its arguments in the following sequence. Section 2 presents 
the institutional features of the State Bank and describes the financial crisis of 1899-
1902. Section 3 quantifies the rescue efforts and macroeconomic outcomes. Section 4 
documents individual rescue efforts in detail and compares them to modern theory and 
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methods of counteracting a crisis. Section 5 studies the way the State Bank mitigated 
moral hazard. Section 6 concludes. 
3.2. The State Bank’s mandate and objectives 
The State Bank of the Russian Empire (hereinafter the Bank) was established in 1860. 
The Bank had a wide range of responsibilities. According to its pre-crisis statutes, the 
Bank was responsible for ‘the alleviation of money flows, facilitation of domestic trade, 
industry, and agriculture by means of short-term credit, and the strengthening of the 
credit system’ (Complete Collection of Laws, 1894, p. 411).38 This meant that the Bank 
was ready to provide liquidity by discounting commercial bills, purchase and sell gold 
and silver, exchange coins for paper money, accept deposits, advance loans, and transact 
with government securities, among other operations (Slansky, 1910). 
The financial stability function was not explicitly outlined in the Bank’s 
mandate. However, the Bank did act as a lender of last resort on multiple occasions since 
the first bank failed under its watch in 1875, as discussed in a later section. The financial 
stability objective was for the first time officially formulated during the 1899-1902 
crisis. In particular, the supplemental notes to the Bank’s annual report for the year 1900 
stated that the Bank ‘must take measures to prevent a crisis, must not let an existing 
crisis develop, and must mitigate the effects of a crisis in the case it breaks out under the 
influence of external or internal causes’ (Russian State Historical Archive (RGIA), 
collection 587, inventory 33, file 101, page 79). The notes continued that ‘(t)he State 
Bank should not hesitate when it comes to the scale of the cost of the full 
implementation of the difficult task that has come upon it; besides, in the form in which 
it is possible to provide real help’ (RGIA, 587, 33, 101, 49). The Bank should, however, 
ensure that ‘its expenses are well-collateralized’ (RGIA, 587, 33, 101, 49), with 
38
 Author’s own translation, as in all other instances of text translated from the Russian language. 
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collateral demonstrating characteristics of ‘soundness and marketability’ (RGIA, 587, 
33, 101, 49). The first public acknowledgement of the lender-of-last-resort function was 
made in the first year of the crisis in the official daily newspaper, in which it was stated 
that ‘(i)n those cases when the crisis affects well-run businesses, such businesses can 
benefit from the State Bank’s support, which the State Bank will provide within the 
limits of prudence’ (Bulletin of Finance, 1899, p. 260). 
The mandate of the Bank did not obligate it to maximize employment. However, 
the Bank generally strove to maintain industrial employment out of the fear that layoffs 
would lead to wider social unrest (Gindin, 1950). The Bank also served as a banker to 
the government by conducting transactions on behalf of the Treasury. Finally, the Bank 
set interest rates on a variety of loans it offered to the public, which in effect served as 
floor interest rates on identical commercial loans. However, with regards to the rate on 
three-month bills, the Bank always kept this rate slightly above the identical rate set by 
the German Imperial Bank (RGIA, 587, 33, 101, 65). 
The Bank was headed by a designated managing director, overseen by a council 
of officials, and its annual reports and its overall strategy were approved by the 
Government Senate. However, the Bank’s ultimate governor was the Minister of 
Finance. The sole owner of the Bank’s capital stock was the State Treasury, which itself 
was a department at the Ministry of Finance (Ministry of Finance, 2002). The Bank’s 
liabilities consisted mostly of the Treasury’s deposits and bank notes and coins (State 
Bank, 1899). 
In 1893, the newly-appointed Minister of Finance, Sergei Witte, introduced new 
economic policies aimed at rapid industrialisation. The goal was to catch up with the 
already industrialised countries in Europe and make Russia great again on the world 
economic, political, and military arena (Gindin, 1957). To reassure foreign investors of 
the country’s creditworthiness, the Bank went on the gold standard in 1897. That meant 
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pegging its official interest rate, the rate on three-month bills, slightly above the rate set 
by the German Imperial Bank (RGIA, 587, 33, 101, 65). The Bank also made sure that 
the gold point, the point at which gold would automatically start flowing out of the 
country, was never reached by meeting all demand for foreign currency (RGIA, 587, 33, 
101, 52. For this purpose, the Bank kept a large amount of gold on its current account 
with foreign banks, equivalent up to 4.7 per cent of its gold reserves.39 In 1898, the Bank 
possessed 946 million rubles of gold reserves, the largest stock among central banks and 
Treasury departments in the world (Green, 1999). 
In 1899, the Bank confronted a systemic financial crisis. Credit shortages in 
Europe forced foreign investors to curtail investments in Russian government bonds and 
industrial securities. This led to a stock market decline and major losses among heavy 
industrial companies, as private and later state demand for their products fell. Unable to 
call on their industrial loans without risking non-payment, banks had no other choice but 
to keep on financing their clients (Bovykin, 1984). Regulatory mark-to-market 
requirements forced banks to register large losses on their investment portfolios (Gindin, 
1950). From official bank audits, we know that key banks were practically bankrupt or 
on the verge of collapse in the early stages of the crisis (Bovykin, 1984). As we saw in 
chapter 2, bank failures would have put an end to Russia’s rapid industrialisation, as 
banks supplied over half of all industrial finance (Bovykin, 1967). However, the Bank 
coordinated a major policy response to prevent this from occurring, in the 
process sacrificing 32.5 per cent of its gold reserves, as examined in the next section.40 
3.3. The rescue effort and macroeconomic outcomes 
This section gives an overview and quantifies the extent of the policy employed by the 
Bank in combating the crisis. 
39
 Calculated based on data from the State Bank (1899-1903). 
40
 Gold reserves are calculated based on data from the State Bank (1899-1903). 
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3.3.1. Quantifying the scale of the rescue effort 
The crisis containment package coordinated by the Bank consisted of five policy tools: 
(1) liquidity provision to financial institutions, including banks and non-banks, (2) 
liquidity provision to individual stock-market investors, (3) acquisition of securities from 
investors, (4) lending to non-financial institutions, and (5) emergency lending to specific 
financial institutions. To quantify the Bank’s policy initiatives, I hand-collected cash-
flow and balance-sheet data from the State Bank’s annual reports for the years 1898-
1902, which I found in the Russian State Library. To understand the motivation behind 
the Bank’s policy measures, I went over all available archival records at the Russian 
State Historical Archive (RGIA) that pertains to the Bank’s decisions and documented 
relevant material. To obtain additional information on the State Bank’s actions, I read 
nearly all available books and dissertations written by contemporary and modern 
scholars concerning the State Bank. 
Note that throughout this chapter, I rely primarily on cash flow rather than on 
balance sheet data when analyzing the Bank’s rescue operations because the former 
measure is a better reflection of the degree of the Bank’s assistance. For example, call 
loans backed by bills, as reported in end of year balance sheets in Panel B of Table 1, 
decreased between 1898 and 1900. However, if measured in the form of cash flows, 
Panel A of Table 1 reveals that call loans actually increased by 62.6 per cent over this 
period. I resort to balance sheet data only when cash flow data are not available. 
Panel A of Table 1 reveals that lender-of-last-resort lending to banks came in six 
different forms: the rediscounting of banks’ bills, direct lending via call and term loans, 
collateralized by bills and securities, and unconventional measures, including the 
reallocation of depositor accounts to banks and repo operations, with each of these 
measures discussed in detail in Section 5. Panel A of Table 1 also shows that in the first 
year of the crisis, which became fully evident only in the summer months of 1899, the 
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Table 1: Support to banks and investors
1898 1899 1900 1901 1902
Panel A: Liquidity to banks, cash flows
213.3 238.3 230.0 193.4Rediscounting of banks’ bills 106.0
Call loans backed by bills 145.2 283.1 460.3 468.4 364.7
Call loans backed by securities 42.0 54.8 100.4 165.4 97.7
17.8 21.0 21.0 20.1 16.9
11.0 10.4 0.2
Term loans backed by securities
Reallocation of current accounts
Repo guarantees 20.3 10.1 7.9
Total 310.9 583.2 850.8 894.2 680.5
Change YOY 88% 46% 5% -24%
Panel B: Liquidity to banks, balance sheets
Rediscounting of banks’ bills 17.3 34.1 39.3 29.2 33.4
Call loans backed by bills 10.0 17.5 17.4 24.3 15.1
Call loans backed by securities 5.7 4.3 15.2 26.1 15.2
Term loans back by securities 13.3 15.7 17.2 17.1 13.0
Reallocation of current accounts 19.6 9.2 9.0 9.0
Repo guarantees 20.3 30.4 38.2
91.1 118.6 136.0 123.9Total 46.3
Change YOY 97% 30% 15% -9%
Panel C: Liquidity to investors, cash flows
75.7 123.6 149.6 156.7 143.2Call loans to stock investors
Change YOY 63% 21% 5% -9%
Panel D: Acquisition of securities, cash flows
1.4 5.1 0.5 -2.0
5.5 22.0 -8.8 -4.2 9.0
Red Cross Fund acquisitions (net)
State Bank acquisitions (net)
Total 5.5 23.4 -3.7 -3.7 7.0
Notes: In millions of rubles. Annual cash flows, except for State Bank and Red Cross Fund
acquisitions, which are net cash flows. End of year balance sheets.
Assumptions: Half of all term loans advanced by the State Bank were directed to com-
mercial banks. All current accounts withdrawn from the State Bank by the public in 1899
onwards were deposited with commercial banks. Half of the total credit guaranteed by the
State Bank via repo guarantees flowed to commercial banks.
Sources: See Appendix Table A1.
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Bank nearly doubled its lending to banks as compared to the prior year, as measured by 
cash inflows to banks.41 In the following two years, 1900 and 1901, the assistance was 
vigorously expanded by a further 51 per cent. To appreciate the extent of this assistance, 
we can see from the end-of-year balance sheet data in Table 2 that the Bank’s lending to 
banks as a share of bank lending to the economy doubled from 6 to 12 per cent in the 
first year of the crisis in 1899 and peaked at 18 per cent at the height of the crisis in 
1901. 
Indeed, as the crisis progressed, the assistance to banks was gaining greater 
importance. Panel A of Table 3 shows that if in 1898, the funding provided to banks had 
made up 29 per cent of the total cash flows the Bank channeled to all enterprises, then in 
1901 banks received as much as 36 per cent of the total. The Bank supported all major 
items on both the asset and liability side of banks’ balance sheets, with the exception of 
banks’ capital stock. 
As a result, referring back to Table 2, banks were able to increase lending by 2.2 
per cent between the end of 1898 and 1901. In 1902, when the crisis began to abate, 
banks expanded credit by a noteworthy 12.7 per cent. 
Cumulatively, the lender-of-last-resort support to banks over the period of 1899-
1902 totaled to 2,697 million rubles.42 This was equivalent to 41 per cent of the 
government’s revenues and 40.1 per cent of corporate profits over the same period.43 In 
addition to providing backstop liquidity to all 40 banks, the Bank lent to 302 non-bank 
41
 It was common practice for the Bank to lend to banks during non-crisis years in order to 
facilitate them in the role of credit suppliers to the economy (Gindin, 1960). 
42
 Crisis-related assistance to banks is cash flows from the Bank for the years 1899-1902 minus 
cash flows to banks in the pre-crisis year of 1898. 
43
 Data on government profits is from the Ministry of Finance (1899a, 1900a, 1901a). Data on 
corporate profits is from the Ministry of Finance (1905b). 
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Table 2: Bank credit supply to economy
1898 1899 1900 1901 1902
Banks’ credit supply to economy 738.8 734.2 744.0 755.0 850.7
Change YOY -1% 1% 1% 13%
State Bank credit as a share of banks’ 6% 12% 16% 18% 15%
Notes: In millions of rubles. End of year balance sheets.
Bank credit supply is the sum of discounting; call loans backed by bills, securities,
and goods; term loans; and corporate securities owned by banks.
Sources: Golubev (1905, 1910).
Table 3: Support to non-financial enterprises
1898 1899 1900 1901 1902
Panel A: Lending, cash flows
775.9 1,207.8 1,393.9 1,614.2 1,322.0
56% 15% 16% -18%
State Bank credit supply to non-banks
Change YOY
State Bank credit supply to banks 310.9 583.2 850.8 894.2 680.5
1,086.9 1,791.0 2,244.7 2,508.4 2,002.5
65% 25% 12% -20%
Total
Change YOY
Credit to banks as a share of total 29% 33% 38% 36% 34%
Panel B: Acquisitions, cash flows
27.6 98.1 47.5 83.3 8.1
80.0 30.0
27.6 98.1 127.5 113.3 8.1
Treasury acquisitions (net)
State Savings Branches acquisitions (net)
Total
Change YOY 255% 30% -11% -93%
Notes: In millions of rubles. Annual cash flows.
Cash flow to all enterprises (Total) is the sum of discounting and rediscounting of bills and other
paper, call loans backed by bills and securities, including those that were reported off-balance
sheet, term loans back by securities, acquisitions of securities made by the Treasury and State Sav-
ings Branches, repo operations with foreign counterparties, and reallocation of current accounts to
banks. Does not include call loans to individual investors or acquisitions of securities by the Red
Cross Fund and the State Bank because these operations affected a broad spectrum of investors,
not just enterprises.
Cash flow to banks is the sum of rediscounting of banks’ bills, all types of call loans, term loans,
reallocation of current accounts, and repo guarantees. State Bank supply to non-banks is the dif-
ference between the cash flow to all enterprises (Total) and the cash flow to banks.
Sources: See Appendix Table A1.
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financial institutions, although at a much smaller scale, all in all supporting nearly two-
thirds of financial institutions (RGIA, 587, 33, 101, 12).44 
The second policy initiative employed by the Bank was the provision of liquidity 
directly to personal investors in the stock market in an attempt to forestall fire-sale 
losses. Panel C of Table 1 shows that between 1898 and 1901, the Bank increased the 
provision of call loans to investors by 107 per cent. Because a typical call loan financed 
50 per cent of a security’s purchase price (Dmitriev-Mamonov & Evzlin, 1916), the 
supply of call loans possibly avoided the liquidation of up to 161 million rubles worth of 
securities bought on margin between 1899 and 1901.45 This amount equated to 9.9 per 
cent of the market capitalization of domestically-traded companies in 1900, assuming 
that only corporate equities were purchased this way.46 
The third programme involved the acquisition of securities from investors. First, 
the Bank made purchases for its own account of government and mortgage securities in 
the secondary market. Panel D of Table 1 shows that although these purchases were not 
large, summing to a net of 18.0 million rubles over the crisis period, they nevertheless 
allowed investors to turn liquid assets into cash. Second, the Bank created an investment 
fund, which acquired shares of selected banks and industrial companies. Panel D of 
Table 1 shows that the fund bought only a net of 5.0 million rubles worth of securities 
over the crisis. However, its actions likely had a calming effect on the market, as will be 
discussed in detail below. 
The Bank’s fourth policy tool involved bypassing the banking system and 
lending directly to businesses. First, as shown in Panel A of Table 3, the Bank increased 
its lending to firms by 108 per cent between 1898 and the height of the crisis in 1901. 
Second, as shown in Panel B of Table 3, the Bank acted on behalf of the Treasury and 
44
 The total number of financial institutions was 551 in 1899 (Golubev, 1899b). 
45
 Calculated as the call loan provision in 1901 minus that in 1898 and multiplied by two. 
46
 The market capitalization was 1,640 million rubles (Bovykin, 1984). 
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along with State Savings Branches purchased corporate bonds for which no buyers were 
found on the market.47 These purchases were large, increasing by 310 per cent between 
1898 and 1901. 
The fifth policy operation involved emergency lending to specific troubled 
financial institutions to avoid systemwide consequences of their failure on the banking 
system and financial markets. In many cases, emergency lending was conducted via the 
so-called non-statutory loans, which violated the Bank’s statute and required the Czar’s 
personal approval in each case. For this reason, exact amounts are not known.48 In 1900, 
only five banks received non-statutory call loans (RGIA, 588, 1, 510). A possible reason 
for resorting to non-statutory financing was because banks did not have legitimate 
collateral to obtain regular call or term loans. Importantly, non-statutory loans, just like 
term loans, were not purely for liquidity provision, because both were for longer 
maturities, and thus carried apparent credit risk. 
On top of the efforts made by the Bank, the fiscal authorities have sought to 
ensure that railroad construction and state procurement of industrial products are 
maintained on pre-crisis levels (Gindin, 1996). Exact amounts are not known as state 
orders were placed by various ministries, rather than by the Bank. Nevertheless, public 
expenditures are estimated to be significant in size (Gindin, 1980), given that in the years 
leading up to the crisis, the government had procured up to 50 per cent of heavy industry 
output (Ozerov, 1905; Gindin, 1996). This was likely a critical element as history offers 
multiple cases when the lack of government expenditures during and following a 
financial crisis led to a prolonged recession and even depression (Crafts & Fearon, 2010; 
Stiglitz, 2013). 
47
 State Savings Branches were popular financial institutions for making deposits among the 
general public. 
48
 Officially titled ‘loans on a special basis’ (Gindin, 1950, p. 87), non-statutory loans were given 
out only to an estimated 35 to 40 financial and non-financial companies (RGIA, 587, 33, 32). 
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Notably, the crisis containment policies employed by the Bank over the 1899-
1902 crisis were identical to the types of policies deployed by the Federal Reserve over 
the 2007-09 financial crisis. Table 4 compares the two crisis responses. The Fed’s policy 
categories included: (1) liquidity provision to financial institutions, (2) acquisition of 
securities from investors, (3) lending to non-financial institutions, and (4) emergency 
lending to financial institutions (Bernanke, 2009). After a careful juxtaposition of the 
two policy responses, it is possible to conclude that the Bank’s approach is very similar 
to that of the Fed’s. The only policy category not employed by the Fed, but implemented 
by the Bank, was direct liquidity provision to personal stock investors, which was the 
Bank’s way to support the precipitously declining stock market. 
Table 4: Comparison of the Fed’s and the State Bank’s programs
Federal Reserve, 2007-09 State Bank, 1899-1902
Liquidity provision to financial institutions Yes1 Yes1
Acquisition of securities from investors Yes2 Yes2
Lending to non-financial institutions Yes3 Yes3
Emergency lending to financial institutions Yes4 Yes4
Liquidity provision to personal investors No Yes5
Notes:
1 The Fed’s programs included the Discount window, the Term auction facility, currency swaps, the
Primary dealer credit facility, and the Money market fund facility. For the State Bank’s programs,
see Panel A of Table 1.
2 The Fed’s acquisitions were large and included mostly agency-backed MBS, but also T-notes and
bonds and agency debt. The acquisitions made by the State Bank and the Red Cross Fund were
not large, as shown in Panel D of Table 1.
3 The Fed’s programs included the Commercial paper funding facility (3-month term) and the Term
asset-based securities loan facility (3-5 year term). The State Bank’s lending see in Panel A of Ta-
ble 3. The State Bank’s purchases of private debt directly from issuers see in Panel B of Table 3.
4 In both cases, the goal was to preserve systemic stability. The Fed’s programs included the cre-
ation of Maiden Lane I, II, III LLC (Bear Stearns and AIG rescues). For the State Bank’s rescues,
see Section 4.5 in text.
5 Call loans to personal stock market investors.
Sources: The types of programs are from Bernanke (2009).
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3.3.2. Macroeconomic outcomes 
What were the outcomes of the rescue package? Figure 1 demonstrates that the Bank 
was successful in maintaining price stability, employment, and financial stability. The 
credit supply by joint-stock commercial banks declined and stayed below the pre-crisis 
level in 1899, 1900, and 1901. However, the peak to trough fall in credit supply of 6.0 
percent was not dramatic, given the fact that part of the fall was due to a reduction of 
short-term loans to personal investors, not business.49 The largely sustained credit supply 
allowed joint-stock businesses to keep on making investments in machinery, real estate, 
land, and other property throughout the crisis.50 The mostly preserved transmission of 
credit and money to the broader economy also helped to keep aggregate and light 
industrial production expanding, which in turn allowed the employment level to increase 
in industry in aggregate and in light industry in particular.51 Industrial growth was then 
reflected in the rise in GNP and in a moderate rise of 3.1 per cent in the consumer price 
index.52 Key financial markets, including the stock, money, and mortgage market 
continued functioning without disruptions. As shown in Figure 2, corporate bond spreads 
did not rise much above 2.5 percent and did not approach anywhere near the levels seen 
in the Great Depression and the Great Recession, during which bond spreads rose above 
seven and six percent, respectively.53 
On the other hand, the stock market fell by 45.4 per cent between February 1899 
and December 1901, depositors ran on 23 out of 40 banks, three banks failed during the 
49
 Calculated based on data from Golubev (1905, 1910). 
50
 Calculated based on data from the Ministry of Finance (1905b). 
51
 Industrial production and employment are from Borodkin (2011a, 2011b). 
52
 GNP is from Gregory (2003). Consumer price index is from Borodkin (2011c). 
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Figure 1. Key macroeconomic and financial indicators (index 1899 = 100), 1899-1903
Notes: Banks’ credit supply, the stock exchange index, and the interest rate are on a monthly basis.
Consumer price index, heavy and light industry employment, and investments by heavy industry are on
a yearly basis. Total money supply includes deposits held by the public at the State Bank (based on
original monthly data), the Russo-Chinese bank (interpolated linearly from beginning- and end-of-year
data), joint-stock commercial banks (monthly data), private commercial banks (beginning- and end-of-
year data), cooperative savings associations (interpolated linearly from semiannual data), as well as state
savings branches, public city banks, credit partnerships, city banks, and savings and loan partnerships (all
interpolated linearly from beginning- and end-of-year data), plus physical money.
Sources: Banks’ credit supply is calculated based on data from Golubev (1905, 1910). Inflation is from
Borodkin (2011c). Heavy and light industry employment is from Borodkin (2011a, 2011b). Investments
by heavy industry are from the Ministry of Finance (1905). The stock exchange index is from Goetzmann













Figure 2. Monthly corporate bond risk premium by industry (in percent), 1899-1903
Notes: The corporate bond risk premium is the excess of current yield on corporate bonds of each of the
three industries over the current yield of the highest-rated government security, the four percent Russian
government bond of 1894. Current yield of each corporate bond is calculated based on price and coupon
data of 37 individual bonds. Gaps in the series are due no trades in those months. Industry yield is the
average yield of traded bonds in every month weighted by the outstanding amount of each bond.
Sources: Price and coupon data is from the Ministry of Finance (1900-1907b). The quantity of bonds
outstanding is from Dmitriev-Mamonov (1903).
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crisis and two went bankrupt in 1904.54 Due to pre-crisis overproduction, deflation 
among raw materials, and the reduction of government procurement, heavy industry 
output declined by 7.7 per cent in 1901-02, and the industry’s employment decreased by 
6.4 per cent over 1900-02.55 
Perhaps the best outcome measure is whether the rescue created a robust 
recovery. Although heavy industry production started to recover once the crisis was fully 
over in 1903, the industry’s employment fell by another 2.5 per cent that year. 
Afterwards, there was a jobless growth in heavy industry.56 More importantly, the 
number of labor strikes at industrial companies, which were reflective of the response of 
workers to working and living conditions, reached unprecedented new levels in 1903, 
turning into a full revolution in 1905 (Pushkareva et al., 2011). Altogether, despite the 
recession and employment losses in heavy industry, it can be said that the Bank was 
successful in achieving its official mandate of price stability and its unwritten goals of 
financial stability and overall employment growth. 
3.4. The evolution of containment measures during the crisis 
This section examines in detail the individual policy tools employed by the Bank in 
stabilizing the banking system and financial markets. Given that the Bank was successful 
in keeping inflation, employment, and the financial system stable, it is instructive to 
learn about the specifics of these tools to see why they were effective. This section also 
compares the extent to which the Bank’s policy measures differed from modern methods 
of counteracting a crisis in an attempt to determine the elements that made the Bank’s 
approach effective. 
54
 I define a bank run as the net cumulative withdrawal of deposits over any one, two, or three 
consecutive years in the amount of 10 per cent or more. Banks’ balance sheet data are from 
Golubev (1898, 1899, 1900, 1901, 1902). Stock market data is from Goetzmann et al. (n. d.a). 
55
 Calculated based on Borodkin’s (2011a, 2011b) data. 
56
 Calculated based on Borodkin’s (2011a, 2011b) data. 
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3.4.1. Liquidity provision to financial institutions 
The Bank’s frontline liquidity assistance was the rediscounting of banks’ bills of 
exchange, as quantified in Panel A of Table 1. In the first months of the crisis, the Bank 
followed the real bills doctrine. Namely, from 30 June 1899, the Bank focused on 
discounting and rediscounting only trade-related, short-term bills (Collection of decrees, 
1900). Less than four months later, in response to ‘a sharp contraction in money 
markets’ (RGIA, 587, 33, 101, 66), the Bank started accepting bills maturing in up to 
eight months. To better appreciate this step, recall that the Federal Reserve refused to 
deviate from the real bills doctrine in the 1930s, with severe implications for banks 
(Meltzer, 2003). The Bank also began to equally welcome bills based on tangible trade 
transactions and those related to purely financial arrangements, the so-called financial 
bills (RGIA, 587, 33, 101, 66). The acceptance of financial bills was especially 
beneficial for banks as they created these bills out of thin air and in exchange received 
borrowers’ collateral that could be put to further use. Thereby, all 40 banks were 
rediscounting with the Bank from the early months of 1900 (RGIA, 587, 33, 101, 12). 
The Bank also stimulated banks to restore credit flows to businesses by agreeing 
from 12 November 1899 to assume half of the losses incurred by banks on the bills they 
brought for rediscounting to the Bank (RGIA, 587, 56, 296, 24-26). The purpose of 
instituting this support was to ease ‘the psychological side of the situation: distrust and 
fear’ (RGIA, 587, 56, 296, 25) among banks towards less creditworthy clients, who 
otherwise would not be able to discount at banks. 
Apart from rediscounting, the Bank extended short-term call loans and medium-
term term loans, both collateralized by either bills or government and corporate 
securities, as shown in Panel A of Table 1.57 This direct lending to banks was introduced 
because, according to the Bank’s annual report for 1900, ‘(t)he (Bank’s own) practice 
57
 With call loans, the lender could request repayment at any time. Term loans followed a pre-
defined repayment schedule. 
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has proven’ (RGIA, 587, 33, 101, 48) that mere rediscounting does not ‘alleviate the 
consequences of a crisis’ (RGIA, 587, 33, 101, 48). In particular, the report explained 
that discounting of trade-related bills ‘cannot alleviate an acute need for money’ (RGIA, 
587, 33, 101, 48) in a situation when the sale of products becomes problematic and 
goods are ‘left unsold’ (RGIA, 587, 33, 101, 48). Likewise, when a lender suddenly calls 
on a borrower’s loan, and the borrower is forced to pay back immediately, rediscounting 
of trade-related bills is a futile activity (RGIA, 587, 33, 101, 48). 
With this reasoning in mind, the Bank eased loan requirements as the crisis 
intensified. First, the Bank lengthened the duration for call loans from 50 days in 1899 to 
over 75 days in 1900 and 101 days in 1902. Bank also lengthened the duration for terms 
loans from 8 months in 1898 to 9 months in 1899 and then again to 10 months in 1900 
(RGIA, 587, 33, 101, 70; RGIA, 587, 33, 102, 35). The granting of longer-term loans 
reduced funding pressures on banks. Second, on 11 June 1900, the Bank equalized 
interest rates it charged on call and term loans, making the previously more expensive 
call loans more attractive to borrowers (RGIA, 587, 33, 101, 57 & 69). 
Third, the Bank narrowed the spread between the interest rate it charged on loans 
backed by longer-term 12-month bills and shorter-term three-month bills and loans 
backed by riskier corporate securities and safer government securities (Collection of 
decrees, 1899-1903). This made it less costly for banks to obtain credit backed by 
longer-term bills and riskier securities. Importantly, given that the gold standard regime 
did not allow the Bank to lower the interest rate on three-month bills below the rate set 
by the German Imperial Bank, the narrowing of spreads on other securities was the 
Bank’s way of lowering interest rates. In fact, Figure 3 shows that right after the stock 
market crash in September 1899, the Bank cut the interest rate on its riskiest loans, those 
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Fourth, as early as 17 April 1899, and then on 9 November 1899, Imperial 
directives gave the Bank the right to accept a wider range of corporate securities as 
adequate collateral for call and term loans (RGIA, 587, 33, 101, 57). The expanded list 
of securities included those that did not trade on the stock exchange and did not have a 
market value due to being rarely traded. As a result, a total of 243 government and 
corporate securities were acceptable via call and term loan facilities in 1900 (RGIA, 588, 
1, 495, 3). In contrast, there were 428 equity and bond securities actively traded on 
Russian stock exchanges that same year, implying that the Bank accepted about half of 
traded collateral plus some that was not tradable.58 
Fifth, the Bank eased haircut requirements.59 In October 1900, State Bank 
applied a 50 and a 40 per cent haircut on equity and fixed income securities, respectively 
(Slansky, 1910). In May 1900, the requirements were eased to 40 and 25 per cent. From 
July 1900, the size of the haircut was reduced to 25 per cent for both types of securities 
(Gindin, 1980). Concessions on collateral requirements were especially valuable because 
they enabled banks to put to use highly burdensome equity and bond securities that were 
constantly declining in market value and that banks had to mark-to-marked on an annual 
basis (Complete Collection of Laws, 1871). In fact, the banking system’s holdings of 
corporate securities abruptly increased by an estimated 55 per cent throughout 1899, 
because industrial clients were unable to repay loans to banks and because banks-
underwriters could not find buyers for the securities they had contracted to sell.60 Indeed, 
liquid collateral was an important element in credit creation. At the end of 1898, 27 per 
58
 Equity securities data is from Goetzmann et al. (n.d.b). Government and corporate bond data is 
from the Ministry of Finance (1902b). 
59
 A haircut is the share of a loan amount that the lender requires the borrower to pledge in order 
to obtain the loan. 
60
 Own estimation, calculated as the increase in corporate securities on banks’ balance sheets, in a 
rapidly and constantly declining securities market. Banks’ balance sheet data is from Golubev 
(1899). 
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cent of all credit advanced by banks to businesses was collateralized by corporate equity 
and fixed income securities.61 
Apart from rediscounting and granting call and term loans, the Bank undertook 
two unconventional liquidity provision measures, as displayed in Panel A of Table 1. 
First, on 22 November 1899, the Bank ceased paying interest on individual current 
accounts, in effect motivating the Bank’s depositors to relocate their cash holdings to 
commercial banks (Migulin, 1904, p. 280). Because 23 out of 40 banks experienced 
acute retail and wholesale depositor runs, this innovative assistance allowed banks to 
replace the lost deposits with the same type of assets. 
In the second unconventional step, from 22 December 1900, the Bank began 
insuring foreign banks that wished to lend to Russian banks and companies against 
foreign exchange risk. The Bank introduced repo operations through which it bought 
foreign currency in exchange for rubles for a set term. This operation eliminated all 
foreign exchange risk for foreign creditors, whereas domestic borrowers benefited from 
cheaper funding from abroad. 
Scholars have long debated the liquidity provision method that is most suitable 
for stabilizing a banking system in a time of crisis. The classic view of Thornton and 
Bagehot (Thornton, 1802; Bagehot, 1873) is to lend freely to illiquid but solvent banks 
against collateral that is considered safe in ordinary times at the prevailing market 
interest rate. In theory, this should address systemic instability, but not necessarily 
prevent individual banks from failing. Alternatively, the New York Fed view (Salter, 
2015), which is also attributed to Goodhart (1988), is to lend to illiquid and insolvent 
institutions on soft terms, such as unsound collateral and below-market rate of interest, to 
the extent necessary to keep credit flowing. Lastly, the Richmond Fed view (Tucker, 
2014), which is also prescribed to Friedman and Schwartz (1963), Goodfriend and King 
61
 Calculated based on banks’ balance sheet data (Golubev, 1898). 
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(1988), and Schwartz (1992), is to lend to the market as a whole via open market 
operations rather than bilaterally. 
Given that the Bank set soft terms on interest rates, duration, collateral, and 
haircuts, the Bank’s liquidity provision most closely resembled that of the New York 
Fed’s. Indeed, the Bank departed early on in the crisis from the classical prescriptions of 
Thornton and Bagehot because it observed that following these prescriptions would not 
be enough to meet banks’ liquidity demand. This suggests that acting in line with the 
modern New York Fed’s view was one of the elements that helped the Bank to address 
financial instability. 
3.4.2. Liquidity provision to personal investors 
The St. Petersburg stock market was irrevocably in decline from February 1899 until the 
end of 1901. One of the reasons for the precipitous downturn was because distressed 
banks, themselves in need of liquidity, reduced the provision of call loans to individual 
investors. As shown in Panel C of Table 1, to counteract the drying up of the market 
liquidity and prevent asset fire sales, the Bank expanded the supply of call loans directly 
to individual stock-market investors. Investors could then use the credit to meet margin 
calls from banks, dispose their equity positions in a more orderly manner, or even 
acquire new securities. 
Do existing theories recommend a central bank to provide liquidity directly to 
personal investors? Liquidity shortages are known to be of two types. One is funding 
liquidity, or the ability to meet obligations when they are due. Another is market 
liquidity, or the ability to buy or sell a security in large amounts without moving its price 
by much. Declining market liquidity is typically associated with fewer transactions, 
investor uncertainty in valuing securities, and reduced ability of firms to issue new 
shares and thus obtain funding liquidity. The standard practice to restore deteriorating 
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market liquidity is to purchase assets from market participants, while at the same time 
providing funding liquidity to cash-constrained borrowers (Cecchetti & Disyatat, 2010). 
The Bank went beyond this practice by providing liquidity to personal investors. Indeed, 
the drying up to call market liquidity, or brokers’ loans as they were called at the time, 
among personal investors is attributable to the stock market crash of 1929 in the U.S. 
(Crafts & Fearon, 2010). This suggests that the direct provision of liquidity to individual 
investors is a potentially efficient tool for reestablishing liquid stock markets. 
3.4.3. Acquisition of securities 
The precipitous stock-market decline and industrial losses undermined counterparties’ 
confidence. To correct the misalignment in asset prices, on 20 October 1899, the Bank 
established an investment fund, unofficially called ‘the stock exchange Red Cross’ 
(Gindin, 1958, p. 41), for the purpose of ‘prevent(ing) the unjustified decline in prices of 
equities circulating on the St. Petersburg stock exchange’ (RGIA, 587, 56, 313, 1). In a 
memo motivating the formation of the fund, the Finance Minister Witte wrote that the 
danger posed by the unconstrained stock market decline is that it might lead not only to 
substantial losses among individual investors, but also to ‘the undermining of confidence 
in enterprises themselves and even entire industries’ (RGIA, 587, 56, 296, 10-12). 
The Bank arranged for 11 commercial banks and four banking houses to become 
members of the fund.62 Other banks that the Bank approached deemed the participation 
in the fund as too risky and thus abstained from joining (Gindin, 1958). The management 
of the fund was prescribed to a special committee, comprised of the members from four 
largest St. Petersburg banks and one banking house, and chaired by the Bank’s managing 
director. The initial capital of 5.35 million rubles was advanced by the Bank, but other 
62
 Banking houses were full-liability financial institutions that provided services similar to those 
offered by commercial banks, but on a smaller scale and for a less prominent clientele (Ananich, 
1991). 
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members were liable for any losses incurred by the fund. If the fund made a profit, the 
first six per cent of the profit was allocated to the Bank, while the remaining 94 per cent 
was equally divided between all members of the syndicate (RGIA, 587, 56, 313, 3). 
Panel D of Table 1 shows the fund’s net purchases by year. The breakdown of 
the fund’s portfolio is known only at one point in time. On 15 February 1902, the fund’s 
portfolio was made up of shares of six banks, worth 20.0 per cent of the fund’s portfolio, 
shares of 12 manufacturing companies, worth 64.1 per cent, and shares of five oil firms, 
representing remaining 15.9 per cent (Bugrov, 2002). With bankers dominating the 
fund’s membership, it seems only natural that the fund delegated a good portion of its 
capital to banking shares. There is also some evidence that the remaining non-bank 
shares in the fund’s portfolio were in fact issued by banks’ corporate clients (Gindin, 
1980, p. 116). 
If the fund’s purchases had any effect on the stock market, it was likely more 
psychological than material. Indeed, in the words of the Bank’s managing director, E. 
Pleske, dating 11 December 1900, ‘the mentality of the stock exchange … is highly 
sensitive to actions of the syndicate’ (Gindin, 1980, p. 115). The Bank’s director 
concluded that the fund ‘have repeatedly served a big service to the stock exchange by 
avoiding the worst’ (Gindin, 1980, p. 115). In addition to organizing the investment 
fund, the Bank intervened in asset markets by acquiring for its own account government 
and mortgage bonds in the secondary market, as shown in Panel D of Table 1. 
Did the Bank’s outright purchases and the orchestration of the fund conform to 
existing theories on how to restore counterparties’ willingness to transact with each 
other? Confidence is one of the central elements of financial intermediation. Uncertainty 
about a bank’s financial strength or even a rumour about its condition might spark retail, 
wholesale, or interbank runs, leading to the bank’s failure (Freixas, 1999; Tucker, 2014). 
Uncertainty might also lead to runs on entire markets if the asset values of securities 
102 
traded in those markets come under doubt (Covitz et al., 2009). To mitigate the lack of 
confidence, a central bank can take the other side of private deals, replacing traders who 
are unwilling to trade by purchasing securities in the open market and thus signaling that 
the depressed valuations of previously-made deals are misplaced (Cecchetti & Disyatat, 
2010). The purchases made by the investment fund and by the Bank are consistent with 
modern practices. Thus, the acquisition of securities by the fund and the Bank supports 
modern theories and practice on how to restore market confidence. 
3.4.4. Lending to non-financial institutions 
The fourth way policymakers mitigated financial instability was by lending directly to 
industry. As shown in Panel A of Table 3, such lending was greater than loans to banks. 
The Bank advanced statutory and non-statutory loans directly to industrial firms at eased 
collateral requirements, which allowed industrial companies, starting from 12 November 
1899, to pledge their own unrealized bond issues for which no buyers were found. The 
Bank also discounted corporate bills at extended maturities (Collection of decrees, 
1900). Panel B of Table 3 displays that the government also purchased of some of the 
larger bond issues of railroad and industrial companies for which no private buyers were 
found (RGIA, 587, 33, 101, 60 & 136; Gindin, 1950), hence providing further long-term 
funding to firms. By assisting industrial companies, the Bank supported banks indirectly. 
In fact, in some cases, the decision to support an industrial firm was motivated primarily 
or solely by the need to protect banks from losses (Gindin, 1950, 1980).63 
Notice that unlike in the recent financial crisis, the Bank did not purchase that 
many assets of questionable quality from investors, including from banks. At the time, 
questionable assets were equity securities of and loans made to industrial companies. 
Instead, the Bank supported the value of industrial securities by means of liquidity 
63
 For individual examples, see Gindin (1950, 1980). 
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provision to personal investors. Whereas fiscal authorities supported the performance of 
industrial companies by lending and government spending. Put differently, although 
banks retained assets of suspect quality on their balance sheets, the performance of these 
assets was buttressed by the government. 
Should a central bank delegate greater assistance to industry or the banking 
sector during a crisis? The literature has not yet addressed this question empirically. 
Nevertheless, history shows that the lack of private and government demand is 
attributable to the protracted duration of the Great Depression in the 1930s and the slow 
recovery after the Great Recession (Crafts & Fearon, 2010; Stiglitz, 2013). The vast 
fiscal response to the 1899-1902 crisis suggests that aggregate demand is a critical part 
of successful crisis containment. 
3.4.5. Emergency lending 
In its final set of programmes, the Bank rescued individual financial institutions because 
of the concern that the failure of these entities would result in spillover and contagion 
effects on key market participants and entire financial markets, as detailed below. 
In one case, the Bank supported a commercial bank to avoid negative 
repercussions on the money market and a knock-on effect on another large bank.64 In the 
Bank’s own words, the decision was motivated by the fact that ‘(t)he collapse of the 
bank could cause uneasiness in the money market and could in particular affect the 
Moscow International Trade Bank’ (Petrov, 1998, p. 96). In another instance, the Bank 
maintained the viability of a banking house for the sake of safeguarding from losses four 
commercial banks, to which the banking house was heavily indebted (Gindin, 1950).65 In 
yet another instance, the Bank was again concerned about spillover effects on a 
particular financial market and non-bank financial institutions. The Bank rescued a 
64
 The rescued bank was the Commercial Bank in Kostroma. 
65
 The banking house was the Banking House L. S. Polyakov. 
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mortgage bank to avoid its default on mortgage bonds.66 This rescue safeguarded the 
mortgage market that investors had regarded as a safe haven because no mortgage bond 
had ever defaulted before. The rescue of the mortgage bank also allowed two non-bank 
financial institutions to avoid sizable losses (Ananich, 1991; Petrov, 1996).67 
At the same time, the Bank seemingly understood the limits of financial 
interconnectedness when it withheld assistance from banks that were not heavily 
exposed to other financial institutions and whose failure would have only limited 
financial repercussions. In particular, in 1901, the Bank withdrew its assistance from two 
commercial banks that were in violation of their statues because they had delegated 
nearly all of their assets to financing a single industrial enterprise (Gertsenshtein, 
1903).68
What do the Bank’s actions tell about how to preserve the stability of a highly 
interconnected financial system? Cecchetti and Disyatat (2010) argue that the decision 
on whether to lend to a particular firm should be based on whether the firm’s failure 
would undermine the stability of the entire financial system or certain financial markets 
as a result of contagion and spillover effects. The measure that determines if the firm is 
systemically important is the extent of its direct and indirect interconnection with 
counterparties (Liu & Quiet, 2015). 
The Bank’s actions suggest that it is worthwhile to preserve highly 
interconnected financial institutions during a crisis, but not necessarily afterwards, as 
will be discussed in detail in the next section. As the same time, the Bank’s decisions 
point to the limited need in preserving financial institutions the failure of which would 
have localised consequences. 
66
 The mortgage bank was the Kharkiv Mortgage Bank. 
67
 The non-bank financial institutions were the partnership of P. & B. Brothers Ryabushinsky and 
the Merchant Cooperative Savings Association. 
68
 Banks’ names were the Kharkov Trade and the Ekaterynoslavsky commercial banks. 
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3.5. Mitigating moral hazard 
Going beyond Bagehot’s principles might lead to heightened risk of moral hazard.69 This 
section addresses the way the Bank mitigated this negative externality. The Bank was 
concerned with two types of moral hazard: (1) future risk-taking by banks in the 
knowledge that they would be rescued again and (2) banks gambling for resurrection at 
the beginning of the crisis. 
3.5.1. Removal of fraudulent banks 
One way the Bank counterbalanced the spread of moral hazard related to future risk-
taking was by withdrawing assistance from most fraudulent banks and letting them fail. 
Although fraud, which I define as a major violation of a bank’s statute, was not the only 
reason why the following banks were allowed to go bankrupt, it was nevertheless one of 
the key motivations that united these failures.70 The Bank withdrew life support from 
five commercial banks, whose assets equated to 12 per cent of the banking system’s 
assets in 1898, including two banks based in St. Petersburg and three in the provinces.71 
69
 Bignon el al. (2011) show that the classical lender of last resort do not increase moral hazard. 
70
 Another element that characterised the failed banks was the absence of bank board members 
connected to top government officials who were in close contact with the Finance Minister Witte. 
This implies that the failed banks did not have influential advocates who could convince the 
Bank in the need to preserve their stability. However, there were other banks that sustained large 
losses and which the Bank kept supporting despite the fact that these banks had no connections to 
top officials. This suggests that the absence of influential government connections was not the 
driving factor behind bank failures. 
Data on personal connections and bank losses is taken from Chapter 2 that I use to calculate the 
difference in means. Results in Table A2 in Appendix reveal that failed and survivor banks are 
statistically significantly different when it comes to bank connections to top government officials. 
71
 Bank assets are from Golubev (1898). 
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Two of these banks closed doors amidst the crisis in 1901, one in 1902 when the crisis 
was on decline, and two in 1904.72 
Economists argue that one way a central bank can limit the spread of moral 
hazard is by providing support on a discretionary basis, a concept known as constructive 
ambiguity so that financial firms are not able to discern a rescue pattern. On the other 
hand, ambiguity in a crisis might only bring unfavorable outcomes, as it might 
undermine the already fragile confidence among counterparties (Cecchetti & Disyatat, 
2010). 
The fact that the Bank let multiple banks fail suggests that from the point of view 
of the remaining banks, the Bank acted ambiguously in its rescue operations. First, it was 
difficult for bankers to determine the exact reasons behind bank liquidations. Second, 
even if the bankers could come to a conclusion that fraud was the chief motive behind 
bank liquidations, it was still indeterminate what degree of fraud would cause the Bank 
to withdraw its assistance. 
It is constructive to note that, in the midst of the crisis, the Bank let only those 
banks fail that had limited interdependency with the rest of the banking system, as they 
delegated most of their financing to just one enterprise and were not involved in 
syndicated loans or underwriting deals (Gertsenshtein, 1903). In the last year of the 
crisis, the Bank withdrew support from the 12th largest bank, as measured by total 
assets. This suggests that the Bank withheld assistance from larger banks only when 
most acute market turmoil had passed. The second way the Bank mitigated moral hazard 
72
The commercial banks’ names were, respectively: the Kharkov Trade and the 
Ekaterynoslavsky, which were allowed to fail in 1901 because of the aforementioned reasons; the 
St. Petersburg-Azovcky and the St. Petersburg Muscovy, which failed in 1902 and 1904, 
respectively, because they were indebted beyond their statutory limits to the rescued Banking 
House L. S. Polyakov mentioned above; and the Commercial Bank in Kostroma, which closed 
doors in 1904 and was also related to the Banking House L. S. Polyakov. Bank names and failure 
dates are from Salomatina (2004). 
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related to future risk-taking was by requiring the assisted banks to accept on their boards 
at least one State Bank official (Gindin, 1960). This allowed authorities to directly 
oversee banks’ operations and their risk-taking activities going forward. 
3.5.2. Communication of the rescue policy 
Modern central bank communication typically involves monetary policy messages and 
fiscal policy announcements (Allard et al., 2013). Rescue policy guidance is not 
commonly practiced. 
To limit moral hazard arising from gambling for resurrection at the onset of the 
crisis, the Ministry of Finance addressed bankers openly in public and privately behind 
closed doors with precautionary announcements. In February 1899, the very first month 
of the stock market decline, the Finance Minister Witte gathered the presidents of St. 
Petersburg banks in his office and announced that the bankers ‘must not expect any 
assistance from the State Bank, and if any bank gets in trouble because of the stock 
market speculation, I will not come to its rescue’ (Lebedev, 2003, p. 389). These words 
were taken seriously by the bankers (Bovykin & Dyakonova, 1996).73 
On 23 October 1899, one month after a major crash on the St. Petersburg stock 
market, the Ministry of Finance made another precautionary statement in the 
Government Herald and the Bulletin of Finance, both official, daily newspapers. The 
Ministry stated that ‘the state and national assets are not an insurance capital for risky 
enterprises’ (Gindin, 1950, p. 90), and that such enterprises should themselves be 
‘responsible for their mistakes, poor management, and bad luck’ (Gindin, 1950, p. 90). 
In other words, authorities made it clear at the beginning of the crisis and again after a 
stock-market crash that the government would not assist banks engaged in speculative 
73
 Indeed, the banker G. Spitzer, in his letter dating 20 March 1899, to А. Rothstein, a head 
banker at the St. Petersburg International Commercial Bank, wrote that Witte’s announcements 
in February 1899 made a sensation in banking circles (Bovykin & Dyakonova, 1996). 
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trading activities or financing risky enterprises. The laying out of the rules of assistance 
was a step toward suppressing moral hazard. At the very least, Witte’s announcements 
precluded banks from engaging in last minute gambling for resurrection. In addition to 
the positive side to Witte’s announcements, there is also a possibility that the Finance 
Minister’s statements undermined banks’ confidence to lend. However, any negative 
effects of Witte’s statements were likely counteracted by the concurrent support 
provided by the Bank, and this is confirmed by the positive trend in bank credit supply. 
3.6. Conclusions 
What should a central bank’s approach be in arresting a financial panic? In this chapter 
has presented a case from the past of a central bank employing a multifaceted approach 
to containing a systemic financial crisis between 1899 and 1902. I have argued that 
price, employment, and financial stability were achieved because of the use of a broad 
spectrum of policy measures to combat the crisis. These findings suggest that there are 
economic advantages for a central bank to have multiple anti-crisis tools at its disposal. 
In particular, the State Bank disregarded the standard policies of a lender of last 
resort and made its own rules on how to deal with a major financial crisis. According to 
these rules, a central bank ‘should not hesitate when it comes to the scale of the cost of 
the full implementation of the difficult task that has come upon it; besides, in the form in 
which it is possible to provide real help’ (RGIA, 587, 33, 101, 49). Indeed, the State 
Bank recognized that to attenuate a concurrent acute industrial crisis, the Imperial Bank 
of Germany merely discounted commercial bills (RGIA, 587, 33, 101, 47-48). In 
contrast, according to the recollection of the State Bank’s managing director, A. 
Konshin, the State Bank employed ‘all possible methods’ in resolving the crisis (Efimkin 
& Spitsyn, 2006, p. 69). Indeed, the State Bank addressed every area in the financial 
system that experienced problems. Have central banks in Europe and the United States 
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learnt about the crisis resolution measures undertaken by the State Bank, perhaps the 
not-so-distant worldwide financial crisis of 1907 would have been largely mitigated. 
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Appendix 3A 
Table A1: data source
Data Source
To banks only:
RGIA (587, 33, 101, 75; 587, 33, 102, 33)Rediscounting of banks’ bills
Rediscounting of banks’ bills (balance sheets)
Call loans backed by bills
Call loans backed by bills (balance sheets)
Call loans backed by securities
Call loans backed by securities (balance sheets)
Term loans backed by securities
State Bank (1899-1903)
RGIA (587, 33, 101, 75 and 134; 587, 33, 102, 30)
State Bank (1899-1903)
RGIA (587, 33, 101, 75; 587, 33, 102, 35)
State Bank (1899-1903)
RGIA (1152, 13, 104, 251; 587, 33, 101, 69; 587, 33, 102, 35)
Term loans backed by securities (balance sheets) State Bank (1899-1903)
Reallocation of current accounts State Bank (1899-1903)
Repo guarantees Slansky (1910)
To investors:
Call loans to stock investors




RGIA (587, 33, 101, 130 and 147; 587, 33, 102, 40);
State Bank (1899-1903)
To all enterprises, including banks:
Discounting and rediscounting of bills
Discounting and rediscounting of other paper
Call loans backed by bills
Call loans backed by securities
RGIA (1152, 13, 104, 241; 587, 33, 101, 66 and 138; 587, 33, 102, 29)
RGIA (1152, 13, 104, 241; 587, 33, 101, 66 and 138; 587, 33, 102, 29)
RGIA (587, 33, 101, 57 and 133; 587, 33, 102, 29);
State Bank (1899-1903)
RGIA (1152, 13, 104, 252; 587, 33, 101, 68; 587, 33, 102, 29);
State Bank (1899-1903)







Term loans backed by securities
Repo guarantees
Term loans backed by merchandise
Term loans to agricultural sector
Term loans to industrial enterprises
Term loans to railroad companies
Reallocation of current accounts
Treasury acquisitions
State Savings Branches acquisitions
RGIA (587, 33, 101, 60 and 136; 587, 33, 102, 30);
State Bank (1899-1903)
Gindin (1950)
Notes: Cash flows, unless otherwise specified.
Table A2: Difference in means: failed versus saved banks
1 2
Member connected to the government -0.953∗∗
(0.452)




Standard errors in parentheses. Difference in means calculated for either equal or unequal
variances.




From financial crisis to revolution: Russia 1899-1905 
‘(T)he exacerbation of the economic needs of the proletariat’ was ‘(t)he root source and 
the most important basis for the entire upcoming revolutionary crisis in Russia’74 
Lenin (1972, p. 9) 
4.1. Introduction 
Recent scholarship has established that financial crises lead to social unrest and 
unexpected voter decisions in elections (Funke et al., 2016). However, the mechanisms 
that give rise to social and political sea change remain debatable. The standard view has 
been that crisis-induced economic shocks, such as the loss of employment, a stock 
market downturn, inflation, or disinflation, reduce households’ income and net worth, 
compelling them to seek changes (DiPasquale & Glaeser, 1998; Brender & Drazen, 
2008; De Bromhead et al., 2013; Lindgren & Vernby, 2016).75 A less common view has 
been that the unequal response by the government to a crisis, as in bailing out banks 
using taxpayer money, can benefit some citizens at the expense of others, in what is 
known as the distributional effect (Halac & Schmukler, 2004; Stiglitz, 2013). The 
economically disadvantaged then express their views at the polls or on the streets. This 
chapter turns to the case of the Russian Revolution of 1905, a period of nationwide 
worker unrest that occurred just two-and-a-half years following the conclusion of a 
major financial crisis, in an effort to bring new evidence to this debate. The 1905 
revolution is unique because when organizing labour strikes in the years leading up to 
74
 Author’s own translation, as in all other instances of text translated from the Russian language. 
75
 For a literature review of economic effects of financial crises on citizens, see Jayadev (2013). 
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1905, workers called for improvements in their living and working conditions, not for 
the elimination of the Czarist autocracy. This allows me to study how mostly material 
and apolitical demands by citizens led to social instability. 
In this chapter, I examine (1) the immediate effect of the Russian financial crisis 
of 1899-1902 on key participants in the economy – that is banks, industry, and the 
government, and (2) how these participants then responded to the crisis and in the 
process affected the fourth key group in the economy: the working class. For that, I 
collected aggregate-level data on the economic performance, such as industry profits and 
worker salaries, of the four aforementioned participants. My primary data source is a 
series of yearbooks published by the Russian Ministry of Finance, which I found in the 
Russian State Library. Remarkably, previous researches have barely used this source 
before. I also pool together economic data sourced from a variety of secondary sources, 
along with non-economic data, such as the number of labour strikes before the 
revolution. In relation to secondary sources, Russian historians often collect and describe 
data, but do not attempt to explicitly use economic theory and quantitative methods to 
draw causal connections between different variables. My contribution in regards to 
secondary material is to synthesize several existing datasets and draw new conclusions 
relying on cliometric analysis. Finally, I obtain narrative evidence to identify how and 
why the economic participants responded to the crisis in the manner they did. 
My main finding is that the response to the crisis by the government transferred 
income and wealth from ordinary workers to industrialists and investors. Unsurprisingly, 
the recipients of transfers weathered the crisis well and profited during the recovery, 
whereas workers’ wages and wealth stagnated. The evidence also suggests that industry 
forced the workforce to either labour longer hours or labour more intensively, thus 
exacerbating their physical well-being. The extant literature has established that workers’ 
poor working and living conditions were the central reason behind the occurrence of 
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labour strikes (Korelin et al., 2005). In light of this fact, my findings suggest that seeing 
their material and physical well-being lag behind or deteriorate, workers likely became 
more prone to go on strikes. 
This study augments the literature arguing that the unequal response to a 
financial crisis by the government can lead to financial redistributions among various 
groups of citizens. In particular, Halac & Schmukler (2004) show that public bailouts of 
banks in five Latin American countries in the 1880s, 1990s, and early 2000s led to the 
redistribution of wealth from regular taxpayers to banks and their clients. Callan et al. 
(2011) show that austerity measures introduced in response to the 2007-09 financial 
crisis in six countries in Europe redistributed income among the citizens. 
The findings of my chapter are also consistent with studies that relate 
government actions directly to social unrest. In particular, Stiglitz (2013) argues that the 
unequal response of American authorities to the 2007-09 financial crisis was the source 
for the social movement against large banks and corporations that started in 2011. 
Finally, my chapter relates to the study by Ponticelli & Voth (2011) who find that 
discretionary budget cuts that were not crisis-related, led to heightened social turmoil 
over the past century in Europe, without examining what the transmission channel was. 
The unique contribution of my chapter is that it shows that the response to the crisis by 
economic participants other than the government can also have regressive consequences. 
This study also augments to the historical literature on the causes of the Russian 
Revolution of 1905, which brought the first fractures to an autocratic regime that had 
existed for hundreds of years. Although an enormous research effort has been expended 
on identifying a complete list of causes of the revolution, only two historians, Gefter 
(1953, 1955) and Gindin (1950), in addition to contemporaries, such as Lenin (1963, 
1967, 1969, 1972), have explored the role of the financial crisis of 1899-1902 and the 
crisis containment by the government as contributing factors to the revolutionary 
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movement. This chapter investigates the role of the government response using a wider 
range of data than employed previously, provides evidence that the actions by industry 
and banks also had a negative impact on the working class, and, as a result, adds more 
weight to the view that the crisis response and its distributional consequences 
contributed to the revolution. 
This chapter builds its arguments in the following sequence. Section 4.2 details 
key causes and effects of the Revolution of 1905. Section 4.3 documents the effects of 
the financial crisis of 1899-1902 on key economic participants, including banks, 
industry, and the government, and their immediate responses to the crisis. Section 4.4 
traces the way these participants affected the remaining key group, the working class. 
Section 4.5 concludes. 
4.2. The Revolution of 1905 
The First Russian Revolution began on the 9th of January 1905, when over 140,000 
factory workers marched towards the Winter Palace in St. Petersburg to deliver a petition 
to the Czar, asking him to alleviate their hardships (Vvedensky, 1952). The workers 
made 17 demands, including the declaration of freedom of speech, press, assembly, 
religion, and the inviolability of the person, the introduction of an eight-hour workday, 
limits on overtime work, and adequate pay (Gapon, 1905). The Czarist government 
responded by sending troops to stop the demonstrators. The day ended with an estimated 
200 protestor deaths (Nevsky, 1922). In the next several months, 90 per cent of factories 
were engulfed in strikes, peasants revolted all across the country, army units positioned 
along the Trans-Siberian Railroad refused to obey orders, and the crew of the battleship 
Potemkin, one of the largest military ships on the Black Sea, mutinied (Korelin et al., 
2005). Industry workers not only initiated the revolution, but were also the last group to 
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stop fighting for their demands in June 1907, when the revolution officially ended 
(Korelin et al., 2005). 
Scholars have expended an enormous amount of effort on studying the causes of 
the revolution. The central reason has been identified as unacceptable living and working 
conditions of workers: penniless wages, long work hours, overtime work, unfair job-
related fines, cruel treatment by supervisors, unauthorized home searches by police, 
unsanitary housing conditions, which led to serious illnesses, and the lack of social 
insurance (Korelin et al., 2005). The second element that contributed to the revolutionary 
movement was advances in the literacy and education of workers, which allowed them to 
become more aware of their deplorable life and political lawlessness (Korelin et al., 
2005). Third, illegal political parties and worker organizations expanded worker 
awareness and helped them formulate their demands (Korelin et al., 2005). Fourth, the 
ruthless suppression by police and military forces of any expression of discontent and 
unmerciful government policies toward workers in general (Korelin et al., 2005). Finally, 
the fifth explanation and the focus of my study, was that the revolution was partially a 
consequence of the 1899-1902, the 1901-02 recession in heavy industry, and crisis 
containment policies undertaken by the government (Gefter, 1953, 1955; Gindin, 1950). 
A unique feature of the period leading up to the revolution was that it was a 
struggle for better material conditions and democratic rights. Workers did not pursue the 
impeachment of the Czar or the change of the social order to socialism. In fact, in the 
minds of workers, the figure of the monarch was not associated with the government and 
repressive state policies (Korelin et al., 2005). Even on the eve of the revolution, workers 
who said anything against the Czar were quickly muted by others. The word socialism 
was regarded as profanity among the working class. Illegal political parties and worker 
organizations focused on disseminating ideas of democratic rights and material 
betterment and seldom touched on the topic of socialism (Pushkareva et al., 2005). 
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Indeed, only a small number of strikes were associated with political demands and 
slogans such as ‘Down with autocracy!’, ‘Down with the government!’, and ‘Long live 
socialism!’ (Pushkareva et al., 2011, p. 106). In 1903, the most rebellious year before the 
revolution, the percentage of workers who put forward political demands was only 8.5 
per cent of the total strikers (Pushkareva et al., 2011). The remaining 91.5 per cent had 
purely economic wishes, expressed by slogans such as ‘An 8-hour working day!’ and 
‘Down with fines!’ (Pushkareva et al., 2011, p. 110). 
Unlike industry workers, peasants, who constituted 77.1 percent of Russia’s 
population in 1897 (Rubakin, 1912), were not a major force behind social unrest before 
the revolution. Between 1900 and 1904, agricultural workers organized 619 protests, 
which were two-and-a-half times more than the number of protests over the previous 
four decades (Anfimov, 1998). The increase in protests was driven by poor harvests in 
1899 and 1901, unemployed industry workers returning home to villages, and most 
importantly by intensified conflicts with landowners due to poorly-designed agricultural 
policies (Korelin et al., 2005). However, because the absolute number of protestors 
constituted only a small share of the total peasant population, peasant uprisings did not 
become a real threat to the Czarist government until 1905 (Korelin et al., 2005). 
One of the key outcomes of the revolution was the signing of the October 
Manifesto in October 1905, which gave the Russian people the freedoms that workers 
had asked for in their petition to the Czar earlier that year. Another key outcome was the 
establishment of the State Duma, a legislative body comprised of popularly-elected 
members, without whose approval no law could be passed from that time on. These 
changes transformed the nation from an absolute autocracy to a constitutional monarchy 
and served as a foundation for the second Russian Revolution of 1917 – a ground-
breaking achievement given the 450-year history of an absolute autocracy in Russia 
(Korelin et al., 2005). 
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4.3. The effect of and responses to the financial crisis 
This section documents the effects of the financial crisis of 1899-1902 on key 
participants in the economy – namely, banks, companies, and the government – and their 
responses to the crisis. To quantify the effect of the financial crisis on economic 
participants, I hand-collected aggregate-level data on the economic performance of the 
aforementioned participants from individual Yearbooks of the Ministry of Finance. I 
collected monthly-, quarterly-, biannual-, and annual-frequency data, whichever was 
available. I then digitized these data and created time series for analysis and visual 
presentation. The novelty of these data is that it allows me to take a macro view on the 
economic conditions of each participant to see how each group was affected by the 
crisis. 
I also use additional economic data, as well as non-economic data, such as the 
number of work-related casualties, that I collect from a variety of secondary sources 
compiled by Russian historians. Typically, Russian historians collect and package data in 
statistical tables, describe the overall trends they seen in the data, but abstain from 
deeper cliometric analysis. My contribution is to pool together data scattered around 
secondary sources and then analyze it through a quantitative and economic perspective. I 
also obtain narrative evidence to identify how and why the economic participants 
responded to the crisis in the manner they did. 
4.3.1. Banking distress and banks’ response 
The financial crisis of 1899-1902 interrupted the rapid industrialisation that Russia was 
undergoing in the 1890s. The crisis was triggered by the reduction in foreign capital 
inflow into government bonds and securities of industrial enterprises. One of the first 
participants in the economy to be affected by the crisis was the banking sector. Figure 1 
shows that bank shares fell more rapidly and steeper than the index of the St. Petersburg 
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stock exchange, which itself declined by 45.4 per cent between February 1899 and the 
end of 1901.76 Banks experienced large losses primarily because of the investments they 
had made in the 1890s in heavy industrial companies. Although there were only five 
bank failures thanks to the vast intervention on the part of the government, official audits 
revealed that key banks were practically bankrupt or on the verge of collapse (Bovykin, 
1984). To prevent a full-scale banking crisis, the authorities intervened with a massive 
rescue package (Gindin, 1950, 1980). The rescue was very successful along certain 
dimensions. To demonstrate that, I construct monthly credit and money supply time 
series based on data from the Yearbooks of the Ministry of Finance. Figure 2 shows that 
private credit supply fell only by 2.5 per cent from peak in May 1899 to trough in June 
1900. Figure 2 also shows that government credit supply, as represented mostly by the 
credit supply by the quasi-central State Bank of Russia, also continued on an upward 
trend. Figure 3 reveals that the total money supply did not experience much deviation 
from its upward direction, with the largest peak-to-trough decline of only 3.7 per cent. In 
sum, the vast rescue package prevented the contraction of the credit and money supply, 
which are both essential for sustained performance in the broader economy (Friedman & 
Schwartz, 1963; Bernanke, 1983). 
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ST. PETERSBURG BANKS 
ST. PETERSBURG STOCK EXCHANGE INDEX 
Figure 1. Monthly indices of the St. Petersburg Stock Exchange and commercial banks headquartered in
St. Petersburg, equally weighted (index 1898 = 100), 1898-1905
Notes: Included in the index of St. Petersburg banks are the Volzhsko-Kamsky, St. Petersburg-Azovcky,
St. Petersburg International, St. Petersburg Muscovy, St. Petersburg Private, Russian for Trade and
Commerce commercial banks, as well as the Russian for Foreign Trade and the St. Petersburg Discount
and Loan banks. The following banks were not included in the index: the Bank Credit Lyonnais because
it did not trade on Russian stock exchanges and the Russo-Chinese Bank because they did not engage in
engage in heavy industry financing.
Sources: The St. Petersburg Stock Exchange data is from Goetzmann et al. (n. d.a) and St. Petersburg
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GOVERNMENT CREDIT SUPPLY 
PRIVATE CREDIT SUPPLY 
Figure 2. Monthly credit supply (in millions of rubles), 1898-1905
Notes: Private credit supply includes credit supplied by joint-stock commercial banks (based on original
monthly data), private commercial banks (interpolated linearly from beginning- and end-of-year data), and
cooperative savings associations (interpolated linearly from semiannual data). Government credit supply
includes credit supplied by the State Bank (monthly data) and the Russo-Chinese Bank that was partially
owned by the government (beginning- and end-of-year data).
Sources: The Ministry of Finance (1900-1907a)
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However, underneath the positive aggregate trends, banks’ lending patterns were 
changing. Banks concluded that the failure of large clients would be too detrimental for 
banks to withstand. Under crisis pressures, banks sustained or even increased lending to 
larger clients while curtailing credit to smaller clientele (Bovykin, 1984). Any remaining 
credit capacity banks rationed to most creditworthy borrowers (Bovykin, 1984). Two 
factors can explain this bank behaviour. First, information asymmetry intensified 
between banks and potential new borrowers as equity collateral that companies pledged 
to obtain loans declined in value due to the precipitous stock market decline. The 
theoretical mechanism behind this process was described by Mishkin (1991). Second, 
banks became more cautious in their lending, due to accumulating non-performing loans, 
investment portfolio losses, and reduced funding from foreign counterparties, a process 
known as a ‘flight to quality’ (Bernanke et al., 1996, p.1). 
Banks’ response to the financial crisis, as manifested in their changing lending 
behaviour, created winners and losers among companies. Indeed, between 1901 and 
1904, large industrial enterprises, as measured by capital stock, performed increasingly 
better financially, while smaller firms declined over the same period (Bovykin, 1984). 
As is often the case, it is the companies with better financial backing that are able to 
weather a crisis, not necessarily the most efficient firms (Franklin, et al., 2015; Hilt, 
2017). 
The getting ahead of large companies had real consequences on workers. 
Research in modern economics indicates that larger companies have stronger bargaining 
power over their employees than do perfectly competitive firms (Trigari & Rotemberg, 
2006). Indeed, Lenin observed that during a financial crisis ‘weak capitalists, the 
capitalists of the ‘second magnitude’, are replaced by more solid millionaires ... who, as 
wealthier in capital, will weight even greater upon the worker’ (Lenin, 1967, p. 85). At 
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the same time, workers had weak bargaining power because there were no legal labour 
unions until 1903 (Vvedensky, 1956). Only factory inspectors, who oversaw industry 
compliance with labour laws and managed disputes between workers and firms, were 
protective of workers’ rights. However, in the years leading up to the revolution, factory 
inspectors simply did not have enough human resources to resolve all ongoing disputes 
(Pushkareva et al., 2011). Taken together, this evidence suggests that the financial crisis 
and banks’ response to the crisis had indirect, yet real effects on workers by propping up 
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Figure 3. Monthly money supply (in millions of rubles), 1898-1905
Notes: Total money supply includes deposits held by the public at the State Bank (based on original
monthly data), the Russo-Chinese bank (interpolated linearly from beginning- and end-of-year data), joint-
stock commercial banks (monthly data), private commercial banks (beginning- and end-of-year data), coop-
erative savings associations (interpolated linearly from semiannual data), as well as state savings branches,
public city banks, credit partnerships, city banks, and savings and loan partnerships (all interpolated lin-
early from beginning- and end-of-year data), plus physical money. Physical money includes paper notes
(monthly data), gold and silver coins in circulation (both interpolated linearly from beginning- and end-
of-year data).
Sources: The Ministry of Finance (1900-1907a)
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4.3.2. Recession and industry response 
The financial crisis affected another key economic participant – heavy industry, which 
consisted of manufacturing, mining, chemical, and timber industries. The rapid 
industrialisation of the 1890s was characterized by the supply of heavy industrial 
products lagging behind demand. In 1900, supply outpaced demand for the first time 
(Gindin, 1996). As a result, Figure 4 shows that heavy industry went into recession in 
1901-02, with output and revenue declines of 7.7 and 6.8 per cent, respectively.77 Light 
industry, on the other hand, was unaffected. 
The next set of figures traces the difficulties experienced by companies 
throughout the crisis. In Figure 5, I calculate the corporate bond risk premium for 
manufacturing, mining, and textile industries as  the excess of current yield on corporate 
bonds over the highest-rated government security, the 4 percent Russian government 
bond of 1894. I collect the current yield based on monthly price and coupon data that I 
collected from the Yearbooks for 37 individual bonds. Figure 5 shows that the cost of 
borrowing for corporations in the bond market rose sharply. The figure also suggests that 
some companies faced low demand for their bond securities. Given that it was customary 
for industrial companies to use proceeds from bond issuance to cover operating 
expenses, rising bond risk premiums and the inability to sell their debt, put many 
industrial enterprises in an illiquid position (RGIA, 587, 56, 296, 10-11). 
Figure 6 shows that foreign investments in corporate securities declined abruptly 
in 1901, netting only 7 million rubles, as opposed to 69 million rubles the year prior, 
putting additional funding pressures on companies. In subsequent years, foreign capital 
inflow only diminished, with net foreign investments turning negative in 1904.78 Figure 
77
 Industry output is calculated based on data from Borodkin (2011a, 2011b) and revenues are 
colledted from the Yearbooks of the Ministry of Finance. 
78
 Calculated based on data from Ol (1925). 
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7 shows that key commodity inputs in heavy industry production experienced a dramatic 
price fall. In particular, the price of coal fell by 35.3 per cent between 1900 and 1903, oil 
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F I N A N C I A L  C R I S I S 
Figure 4. Annual monetary value of output and revenues of heavy industry (in millions of rubles), 1898-
1905
Sources: Monetary value of output is from Borodkin (2011a, 2011b) and revenues are from the Ministry
of Finance (1900-1907a)
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per cent, respectively, between 1899 and 1903.79 Dramatic commodity declines were 
especially threatening to smaller companies. To maintain their profitability, heavy 
industrial companies responded by engaging in destructive price wars, which again 
reflected most negatively on smaller companies because they had least amount of capital 
reserves and bank banking (Shpolyanski, 1953). With larger companies outpacing the 
rest, workers’ bargaining power was diminished, following the same dynamics described 
in the previous sub-section. 
4.3.3. Fiscal distress and government response 
The third economic participant directly affected by the crisis was the government. The 
biggest adverse shock to state finances came from abroad. To show that, I collect annual 
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Figure 5. Monthly corporate bond risk premium by industry (in percent), 1898-1904
Notes: The corporate bond risk premium is the excess of current yield on corporate bonds of each of the
three industries over the current yield of the highest-rated government security, the four percent Russian
government bond of 1894. Current yield of each corporate bond is calculated based on price and coupon
data of 37 individual bonds. Gaps in the series are due no trades in those months. Industry yield is the
average yield of traded bonds in every month weighted by the outstanding amount of each bond.
Sources: Price and coupon data is from the Ministry of Finance (1900-1907a). The quantity of bonds out-
standing is from Dmitriev-Mamonov (1903).
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data on foreign and domestic government debt outstanding from the Yearbooks. Figure 8 
suggests that foreign investors nearly stopped purchasing government bonds with the 
onset of the crisis. Such bonds had previously been a major source for funding state 
procurement of industrial products. Figure 8 also shows that the net amount of railroad 
debt decreased by over 6 per cent between 1899 and 1903. Unable to find buyers abroad, 
the government pursued domestic investors, who purchased an additional 20.5 per cent 
of domestic debt between 1899 and 1903. Another stress on government finances came 
from the drop in grain exports in the first year of the crisis, leading to a negative trade 
balance of 56 million rubles, as compared to an average surplus of 106 million rubles 
over the previous two years (Valetov, 2017). An additional stress came from an 
especially poor harvest in 1901, the worst of its kind since the devastating famine of 
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Figure 8. Annual foreign and domestic government debt outstanding (in millions of rubles), 1898-1903
Sources: The Ministry of Finance (1900-1907a)
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To lessen the impact of the crisis on industry, the government implemented three 
programmes. Contrary to their stated intention, some of these programmes only 
prolonged the duration of the crisis. First, seeing the deadly consequences of price wars, 
in 1901 authorities set out to establish ‘fair’ and ‘normal’ profitability among industrial 
companies by attempting to maintain state procurement of industrial products at pre-
crisis levels and at above market prices (Gindin, 2007, p. 70). Prior to the crisis, state 
procurement comprised over half of aggregate demand for heavy industrial products 
(Ozerov, 1905; Gindin, 1996). According to the Ministry of Finance, the purpose was to 
preserve industrial growth and ‘avoid the need of reducing the number of workers’ 
(Gindin, 1996, p. 80). Contemporary estimations point that the state was able to maintain 
its purchases on pre-crisis levels in 1899 and 1900. However, the reduction in foreign 
capital inflow forced the government to reduce procurement in 1901-02, which 
contributed to the recession in heavy industry over the same period (Gindin, 1996). 
However, state procurement benefited only the companies that had been 
receiving state orders prior to the crisis (Gindin, 2007). Because state orders in the 1890s 
were typically large, to qualify for them a company had to have a sizable production 
capacity in the first place (Gindin, 1996). This meant that during the crisis mostly larger 
companies were able to obtain contracts from the state. This led to the strengthening of 
larger enterprises and the weakening of smaller ones. 
The second industry assistance programme involved authorities openly 
encouraging industrial firms to collude and form cartels and syndicates instead of 
engaging in price wars. This policy was the polar opposite of the stance the Ministry of 
Finance had taken on in the 1890s, when it had pushed for intense market competition in 
order to make Russian industry more competitive on foreign markets (Gindin, 2007). In 
November 1901, in its official daily newspaper, The Bulletin of Finance, the Ministry of 
Finance openly put forward that ‘(i)f industrialists … would recognize it useful to join 
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efforts in seeking a way out of the existing situation, then they would not encounter 
obstacles to their endeavours from the Ministry of Finance’ (Gindin, 2007, p. 74). The 
Ministry also noted that ‘larger factories (we)re getting ahead’ (Gindin, 2007, p. 74), and 
if that continued, only a very limited number of companies would survive. The choice 
was thus twofold: either organize a syndicate that would include all firms as its members 
‘or let (small and weak firms) perish’, while letting remaining enterprises ‘occupy a 
monopoly position’ (Gindin, 2007, p. 74). 
This policy did not quite work as intended because from late 1901 companies 
began colluding, but not all market players agreed to join in. Large companies that were 
receiving state procurement found it more profitable to stay away from these alliances 
(Shpolyanski, 1953). Fierce competition broke out between syndicated companies and 
the recipients of state orders. While the syndicates tended to limit production to drive 
prices upwards, the recipients leaned towards reducing their prices. These price wars 
typically ended in the late 1900s when either the recipients joined existing syndicates or 
the syndicates dissolved under the pressure from outsiders. In most cases, as state 
procurement diminished, the recipients were forced to unite with cartels (Shpolyanski, 
1953). 
The third government programme included direct lending to industry and 
purchasing of corporate bonds for which no private buyers were found. Although these 
programmes were large in size (State Bank, 1899-1903), they only benefited a limited 
number of firms as compared to 608 public, heavy industrial companies operating in 
1902.80 Cumulatively, the effect of the industry assistance was to distort market 
competition and create industrial winners and losers, who could then weight on the 
unprotected working class, instead of engaging in efficiency improvements to overcome 
the crisis in a level-playing-field competition. 
80
 The number of firms is based on data from Dmitriev-Mamonov (1903). 
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4.4. Impact on workers 
Having established the channels through which the financial crisis affected major 
economic participants – that is banks, industry, and the government – and having 
analyzed their immediate response to the crisis, this section turns to examining the way 
these parties affected another key member in the economy: industry workers. 
4.4.1. Industry and workers 
Figure 9 shows that in response to the crisis, heavy industrial companies downsized their 
labour force by an average of three per cent per year between 1901 and 1903.81 Rising 
unemployment did not just hurt those who lost their jobs. It also affected the workers 
who were able to retain their jobs because of the downward pressure on wages given that 
companies now had a wider pool of skilled employees to choose from. More 
importantly, as analyzed below, firms in all probability intensified the exploitation of 
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Figure 9. Annual number of workers at industrial companies, 1898-1905
Sources: Borodkin (2011a, 2011b)
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workers. I define exploitation as either the increase in work intensity given the same 
number of hours worked or additional overtime work with no change in the work pace. 
The overarching evidence for this comes from the upward trend in the number of strikes 
that workers organized following the financial crisis. Specifically, a labour strike was the 
refusal to work because of a disagreement over working conditions, including pay. 
Figure 10 shows that workers had been organizing strikes in large numbers since 
1895. The financial crisis itself did not coincide with a greater incidence of strikes. It 
was only in 1903, the year right after the end of the recession in heavy industry, that the 
number of strikes spiked to unprecedented levels, rising two-and-a-half times from the 
previous year.82 In 1903, strikes covered 65 out of 78 provinces, involving workers of 
nearly all vocations (Korelin et al., 2005). In 1904, Russia went to war with Japan, and 
the number of strikes fell to historical averages. That was because the government, in 
collaboration with company managers, made sure that most dissatisfied and rebellious 
workers were sent to the war front. Vacancies were replaced with newly-recruited 
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Figure 10. Annual number of strikes organized by workers, 1895-1904
Sources: Pushkareva et al. (2011)
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peasants from the countryside who were too new to the scene to engage in protest 
immediately (Pushkareva et al., 2008). Despite these formidable obstacles, the first 
Russian revolution erupted in January 1905. 
Two additional facts suggest that worker hardships were on the rise even before 
the escalation in the number of strikes in 1903 and before the end of the financial crisis 
in 1902. Figure 11 shows that between 1900 and 1901 of the number of workers who 
expressed a work-related complaint nearly doubled, from about 24,000 to almost 
48,000.83 This suggests that worker discontent rose substantially amidst the crisis; it was 
just expressed in a more civil way. Secondly, in October 1902, the Finance Minister, 
Sergei Witte, expressed his view in a conversation with the Minister of Internal Affairs 
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Figure 11. Annual number of workers who expressed a complaint, 1900-1904
Sources: Pushkareva et al. (2011)
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that the worker movement reached such dangerous levels that it would be impossible to 
stop it by repressive measures (Korelin et al., 2005). The Finance Minister Witte was one 
of the most informed individuals in the country. Over 200 factory inspectors, introduced 
above, reported to him. Wageworker dissatisfaction must have notably deteriorated for 
the Finance Minister to pick up the heating up in social turmoil even before it physically 
manifested itself in the form of widespread strikes in 1903. 
The next piece of evidence speaks more directly to the possible exploitation of 
workers. Indicative of that is the ratio of the number of work-related injuries and deaths 
at all mining plants and coal, iron, manganese, and copper mines over the number of 
workers at these facilities, which covered over 72 per cent of the entire heavy industry 
employment in 1899.84 If in 1897, 1.9 per cent of all workers employed at these plants   
and mines suffered from work-related causalities, then in the first year of the crisis in 
1899, 3.5 per cent were affected. In 1902, an unprecedented 33,613 workers, or 5.4 per 
cent of the total were hurt. Taking a closer look at Southern coal mines, if in 1897, 0.7 
workers got injured or killed for every 16.38 thousand tonnes of coal and anthracite 
extracted, then in 1901 that number soared to 5.4 workers and in 1903 to 8.2 workers.85 
In a matter of two years, Southern coal mines became over six times more dangerous for 
those who worked in them. 
The next set of evidence offers another way to examine whether working 
conditions were deteriorating. The share of strikes in which workers in mining industries 
demanded improvements in work conditions, namely in the quality of machines and 
tools used and social benefits received, increased from an average of 7.5 per cent in the 
period 1895-99 to 9.4 per cent in 1900-04. In the manufacturing industry, this share 
increased by an even greater amount: from a mean of 5.7 per cent in 1895-99, to 9.8 per 
84
 Employment is calculated based on data from Borodkin (2009a, 2011a, 2011b). 
85
 Calculated based on data from Borodkin (2009b). 
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cent in 1900-04 (Shilnikova, 2012). These changes in worker demands were partly due 
to the fact that workers were becoming increasingly aware of their unacceptable working 
conditions. Illegal political parties played an important role in disseminating information 
and assisting workers in raising their awareness (Pushkareva et. al., 2005). However, as 
shown in Figure 12, the percentage of strikes in the manufacturing industry organized 
under direct influence of illegal political parties declined from about 46 per cent in 1900 
to 16 per cent in 1904, while the number of strikes kept on rising.86 This suggests that 
although workers were indeed becoming more conscious of their poor working 
conditions, other factors were responsible for worker discontent, with worsening 
working conditions likely being one of the driving factors. 
This next fragment of data examines worker exploitation from the point of view 
of company financials, which I collected from the Yearbooks. Figure 13 indicates that 
manufacturing and chemical companies were able to maintain their profitability, as 
measured by the profit margin, or the ratio of net income to revenues, throughout the 
entire crisis despite declining sales. In 1903, when the number of strikes rose 2.5 times 
and workers skipped many days from work, manufacturers made an extra 0.9 per cent in 
profit margins versus the prior year. In 1904, the year when Japan entered the war 
against Russia and sales at heavy industries plummeted by 62.5 per cent, all heavy 
industries – that is manufacturing, mining, and chemical – doubled or tripled their profit 
margins. Industrialists made steady returns in all circumstances: economic upturns and 
downturns, diverging performance of larger versus smaller companies, and periods of 
social unrest and war. To maintain such stellar bottom-line performance, companies had 
to skilfully manage the costs of raw materials, the use of machinery, and/or the labour 
force. It is probably fair to suggest that the steady profitability was achieved not solely 
thanks to proficient managerial skills. 
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Figure 12. Influence of political parties at manufacturing firms, 1898-1904










Figure 13. Annual heavy industry profit margins (in percent), 1898-1905
Notes: Profit margin is net income divided by revenues.
Sources: Net income and revenues are from the Ministry of Finance (1900-1907a)
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This next set of data examines non-financial characteristics of the ferrous 
metallurgical industry – that is the metallurgy of iron and its alloys – which employed 
over 31 per cent of all heavy industry workers in 1899.87 Figure 14 plots the number of 
workers, cumulative horse power of engines available for use, and output produced in 
tones by this industry. Recall that 1903 was distinguished by a surge in worker unrest 
and 1904 by a war with Japan and disastrous corporate sales. During these two years, the 
number of workers in the ferrous metallurgy stayed virtually unchanged, horse power 
declined by nearly 9 per cent, while output rose by 16 per cent.88 A natural question to 
ask based on these diverging trends is: did workers become more productive or more 
exploited over this period? It is known that during the financial crisis, companies 
introduced higher-powered and more efficient steam and internal combustion engines 
(Kafengauz, 1994), so that might account for some increase in productivity. However, 
fluctuations in output, as in the five per cent increase over 1903-04, could also be 
indicative of overtime work. In fact, during the war with Japan, overtime work became a 
necessity at companies that fulfilled rushed military orders (Korelin et al., 2005). 
Overall, given declining horse power and unchanged labour force, increasing output 
suggests that the ferrous metallurgical industry was taking advantage of workers by 
shifting from capital intensive to labour intensive production. Furthermore, the fact that 
firms had an opportunity to shift from capital to labour inputs suggests that there were 
few incentives for companies to seek a way out of the recession via efficiency 
improvements (Gefter, 1953). Indeed, both theory and empirical evidence indicates that 
monopolistic entities are poor innovators (Hicks, 1935; Arrow; 1962). 
The above evidence on the rise in the number of strikes, worker complaints, 
demands for better working conditions, and work-related casualties, as well as on the 
87
 Employment is calculated based on data from Borodkin (2011a, 2011b). 
88
 Calculated based on data from Borodkin (2011b). 
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increase in corporate profitability despite collapsing sales and on the increase in output 
despite declining horse power, all suggest that industry’s response to the crisis 
transferred a good portion of their burden to the working class. 
4.4.2. Government and workers 
Another economic participant that had a direct impact on workers’ wellbeing was the 
government. In response to the failure to find foreign buyers for government bonds, 
authorities shifted part of the budget shortfall onto workers by imposing progressively 
higher taxes, which I gathered from publications titled Government Revenues and 
Expenditures. Taxes collected from liquor sales increased by an astonishing 35 per cent 
between 1900 and 1904. Indirect taxes on daily consumer products, like sugar, spiked by 
26 per cent over the same period. Although workers’ real wages outpaced inflation by 5 
per cent over this period (Strumilin, 1966), what is important is that the government 
purposely chose to levy higher taxes on most basic consumer needs, when many workers 
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Figure 14. Annual physical output, machine power, and the number of workers in the ferrous metallur-
gical industry (index 1898 = 100), 1898-1905
Sources: Borodkin (2011b)
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Compare this to the favourable terms on which companies were treated. For that, I 
gathered corporate incomes taxes from Government Revenues and Expenditures. Figure 
15 reveals that the corporate income taxes collected from public and private companies 
increased by a much smaller extent – just 14 per cent over this period. The corporate 
taxes were also smaller in absolute terms: 54.1 million rubles in 1899 as opposed 463.4 
million rubles in indirect and liquor taxes. 
The government then channelled taxpayer money to the assistance of industry. 
As described above, authorities aimed at maintaining procurement of industrial products 
on pre-crisis levels, predominantly financing these expenditures by raising indirect and 
liquor taxes and selling government debt domestically. The State Bank, a quasi-central 
bank of Russia, lent directly to enterprises and acquired corporate bonds by drawing 
from the Treasury’s account with the State Bank (State Bank, 1900). Finally, state 
savings branches, by far the most popular state-owned financial institutions for making 
deposits among the general public, used public money to purchase 110 million rubles of 
railroad bonds in 1901-02 (Gindin, 1950). 
The result of the assistance to industry was a distributional effect in the form of 
an income transfer from regular taxpayers to capitalists (Gefter, 1955). Figure 16 traces 
the flow of funds from taxpayers to capitalists between 1900 and 1905, the only period 
there are data available for comparison. To construct this figure, I used both primary and 
secondary sources. Namely, data on taxes, government revenues and capital gains on 
investments, I obtained from Government Revenues and Expenditures. Corporate net 
income and revenues are from the Yearbooks. Worker wages are from Pushkareva et al. 
(2011). Physical output and the number of workers at mining industry are from Borodkin 
(2011a). 
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Figure 16 shows that industrialists fared well at the expense of workers. Between 
1900 and 1904, the increase in liquor and indirect taxes of 28.5 per cent, which most 
heavy fell on the lower classes, outpaced both the increase in corporate net income of 
25.9 per cent and corporate revenues of 19.1 per cent. Investors too fared well. Capital 
gains on securities owned, which were mostly due to dividends, increased by 23.1 per 
cent over the same time period. 
Figure 16 also reveals that after having benefited from government assistance, 
industrialists did not pass a fair share of profits to workers. Productivity among the 
mining industry, calculated as industries’ physical output per the number of workers, 
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Figure 15. Corporate income tax and indirect and liquor taxes (index 1900 = 100), 1900-1905
Notes: Liquor taxes include indirect taxes on liquor and taxes received by the government monopoly on
the sale of liquor. Indirect taxes include taxes on tobacco, sugar, and matches.
Sources: All taxes are from the Ministry of Finance (1899-1906b)
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only 10.9 per cent.89 The redistribution of income from the lower classes to industrialists 
and investors only contributed to depressing consumer demand for industrial products, 
like the use of passenger trains, thus prolonging the crisis. 
The result of workers’ incomes falling behind was stagnant wealth. Studying 
data on the aforementioned state savings branches, Lenin (1963) concluded that in 1899 
only 8.3 per cent of all workers had the means to make a deposit. The working class 
ranked last as measured by the amount of savings in rubles per a depository account, 
without counting soldiers whose monetary needs were taken care of by the state. Even 
domestic workers with 143 rubles per account had more savings than industry workers 
with 136 rubles per account (Lenin, 1963). Moreover, more than a third of workers had a 
liquid net worth of 25 rubles or less, which was equivalent to 1.6 months of an average 
worker’s pay (Ministry of Finance, 1902a).90 Between 1899 and 1904, workers’ wealth 
was virtually unchanged, rising only slightly from 136 to 138 rubles per account in 1904 
(Ministry of Finance, 1902-1907a). 
89
 To ensure that this estimation is conservative, I assume that the number of hours worked per 
worker stayed constant over the years. Due to the lack of data on physical output for the 
manufacturing industry, it is not possible to estimate its productivity. 
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Figure 16. Financial conditions of key economic groups (index 1900 = 100), 1900-1905
Notes: Liquor taxes include indirect taxes on liquor and taxes received by the government monopoly on the
sale of liquor. Indirect taxes include taxes on tobacco, sugar, and matches.
Capital gains are calculated as taxes collected from corporate securities owned by public divided by five per-
cent, a flat capital gains tax effective since 1885 (Complete Collection of Laws, 1885).
Productivity among mining industries is calculated as the change in industries physical output per the num-
ber of workers. To ensure that the estimation is conservative, I assume that the number of hours worked per
worker stayed constant over the years. Mining industries include coal, iron ore, copper, oil, manganese, gray
pyrite, silver-lead, zinc ore, chromium ore, asbestos, salt, gold, platinum, and peat; and do not include the
coke industry, due to the lack of data, and which represented 6.4 percent of the aggregate monetary output of
mining industries.
Worker wages are nominal.
Sources: All taxes, government revenues, and taxes on capital gains are from the Ministry of Finance (1899-
1906b). Corporate net income and revenues are from the Ministry of Finance (1900-1907a). Worker wages




The mainstream literature has established that financial crises directly reduce 
households’ income and wealth. Deteriorating material conditions of households then 
cause discontent and social unrest. The case of Russia in the period 1899 to 1905 offers 
support to an alternative view. In particular, this chapter finds that the response to the 
crisis by the government and industry transferred income and wealth from ordinary 
workers to capitalists. The recipients of transfers profited during the recovery, whereas 
workers’ material conditions stagnated. The evidence also suggests that industry forced 
the labour force to either work longer hours or more intensively, thus worsening their 
physical well-being. From the extant literature we know that poor working and living 
conditions were the central reason behind the occurrence of labour strikes. With this fact 
in mind, this chapter’s findings suggest that the inequitable sharing of crisis-induced 
losses among key economic participants appears to have contributed to the occurrence of 
strikes. 
If policy-makers take the side of the mainstream view, then their focus would 
predictably be on stabilizing the banking system, non-bank financial institutions, and 
financial markets, and then letting free markets determine the outcomes. If, on the other 
hand, policy-makers take the view that financial redistributions are not only crisis-made, 
but also occur because of the response to the crisis, then restoring financial system 
stability might not be enough to prevent social upheaval and political fallouts. 
My findings open up an avenue for future research. Using micro-level data, 
future work could test empirically whether worker unrest was driven by crisis-induced 
economic shocks or by the response to these shocks. For that, scholars could use 
available data on company financial and non-financial characteristics as well as records 





5.1. Overview of chapters 
In Chapter 2, I ask whether industrial policies can lead to bank distress. In the 1890s, the 
Russian Empire was undergoing rapid state-led industrialisation. Growth was propelled 
by foreign capital inflow into national debt and by state procurement of private sector 
industrial output. Concurrently, state policies incentivised, although did not compel, 
commercial banks to finance industry. In 1899, the inflow of foreign capital fell sharply, 
initiating a financial crisis. Based on new historical data, I find that the banks that 
experienced greater distress in the crisis had more personal connections to government 
officials who were close to the epicentre of policymaking. Additionally, the banks that 
suffered greater distress had more personal ties to companies that had been highly 
stimulated by state policies to expand production. Taken together, these two findings 
point to a destabilising impact of national development policies on bank performance. 
In Chapter 3, I document that, when faced with a systemic financial crisis in 
1899, the Russian State Bank went beyond the classical lender of last resort policy and 
implemented a multifaceted approach to crisis containment. Based on financial statement 
data and archival records on policy decisions, this chapter analyses the rescue operations 
and their effect. I find that the multifaceted approach was successful in maintaining 
price, employment, and financial stability. The evidence also suggests that the State 
Bank’s crisis response was identical to the types of policies employed over a century 
later by the Federal Reserve during the 2007-09 financial crisis. 
In Chapter 4, I ask through what channels financial crises can lead to social 
unrest. This chapter examines the period between a major financial crisis that began in 
Russia in 1899 and the Russian Revolution of 1905. Based on new aggregate-level data 
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and narrative evidence, this chapter finds that in response to the crisis, the Russian 
government and industry transferred income and wealth from ordinary workers to 
industrialists and investors. The recipients of transfers weathered the crisis well and 
profited during the recovery, whereas workers’ wages and wealth stagnated. The 
evidence also suggests that industry forced the labour force to either work longer hours 
or more intensively. Ultimately, the distributional effect of the response to the crisis 
appears to have contributed to the occurrence of labour strikes. 
One limitation of my research is that some of my findings are based on statistical 
correlations rather than on econometric analysis that is able disentangle cause from 
effect. Instead, I draw causal links using narrative and historical evidence. Like 
economists, historians strive to understand causal connections. However, they do so by 
'inferring causality from detailed context (and from) the plausibility of alternative 
narratives’ (Morck & Yeung, 2011, p. 1). While Chapter 4, in particular, may benefit 
from a regression analysis, I stand behind my current conclusions due to the 
preponderance of collected evidence. 
In fact, in future research, I plan to build on Chapter 4 by using micro-level data 
to investigate empirically two questions. First, whether the companies that experienced 
greater distress as the result of the 1899-1902 financial crisis faced a greater incidence of 
strikes in the years leading up to the 1905 revolution. Second, whether the companies 
that passed a smaller share of their profits to employees and reinvested less into their 
businesses faced a greater incidence of strikes. Given the findings in Chapter 4, I expect 
that businesses passed their financial difficulties onto workers, who then retaliated with 
strikes. For this future research, I would use available data on company financial 
performance and on the occurrence of 6,349 strikes between 1899 and 1904 (Pushkareva 
et al, 2011). 
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5.2. Lessons for today 
Although my work is historical in nature, it is possible to draw some broad lessons from 
my findings for today. One lesson from  Chapter 2, which is on the role of the 
government in bank distress, is that policy-makers would benefit from paying special 
attention, not only to banking regulation and supervision, but also to the incentives they 
give to banks. For example, in the early and mid-2000s, some investment banks 
reoriented their business strategies towards mortgage finance after government-
sponsored enterprises, like Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, showed the bankers how 
profitable subprime finance was. 
Modern policy-makers put a lot of emphasis on fine-tuning macro-prudential and 
micro-prudential regulation. The Chicago Fed, for instance, tracks 105 indicators of 
financial activity and 85 indicators of economic activity (FRB of Chicago, n.d.a, n.d.b). 
Yet, even a well-capitalised bank can incur significant losses and fail after making bad 
credit risk investments. If many banks incur losses this way, a banking crisis might 
follow. A practical lesson from Chapter 2 is that the government might consider 
monitoring not only financial and economic conditions, but also the impact of its own 
actions and nation-wide policies on market players. 
Chapter 3, which is on the State Bank’s rescue operations, brings to mind the 
famous quote by John Maynard Keynes that ‘(p)ractical men, who believe themselves to 
be quite except from any intellectual influence, are usually the slaves of some defunct 
economist’ (1936, p. 383). Central bankers’ responses to financial crises in Europe and 
in the U.S. in the late 19th and early 20th centuries are stark examples of Keynes’ insight 
occurring in real life. Bagehotian principles of liquidity provision, the real bills doctrine, 
and the liquidationist theory were some of the concepts that central bankers of the time 
followed closely. Ironically, even present-day heated debates among central bankers 
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revolve around whether it would be appropriate to respond to a future financial crisis 
following the rules of a journalist and essayist who wrote them nearly 150 years ago. 
One lesson that Chapter 3 offers to modern policy-makers is that Bagehot’s 
dictum of the lender-of-last-resort needs modification. Modern financial systems have 
gained much additional complexity. It is time for authorities to detach themselves from 
the intellectual influence of Walter Bagehot and ask themselves with all seriousness 
whether they want to provide real help in a time of crisis or not. 
With regards to Chapter 4 on the response to the crisis having distributional 
consequences, a lesson for policy-makers is that they should not forget that the 
participants in the financial system constitute only one group of people in the economy. 
There are also businesses and households. Helping one group to recover from a crisis at 
the expense of other groups might lead to unintended social and political consequences. 
A successful resolution of a financial crisis is no longer just about making sure that 
credit flows to the economy. 
Finally, the period between the early 1890s and 1905 in Russia in its core 
elements is reminiscent of the events that took place in the 2000s and the early 2010s in 
the United States. Despite its banality, the overall lesson of my thesis to policy-makers 
of today is that ‘(t)hose who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it’ 
(Santayana, 1905, p. 284). 
5.3. Counterfactual 
Ferguson (2011) advises historians to learn from past events not just by describing and 
analysing them, but also by asking what could have been done differently in that moment 
of history. Following his advice, in this final section, I pose a counterfactual: what could 
the Minister of Finance Sergei Witte have done differently in 1890s to avoid the crisis of 
1899-1902 and the Revolution of 1905, given the reality surrounding him? 
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First, were the rapid industrialisation policies of the 1890s a mistake? Taken as a 
whole, I do not believe so. Although Witte understood the value of a modernised 
agricultural sector and a motivated peasant population (Witte, 1904), he was not 
successful in making any meaningful changes to peasants’ lives because of the immense 
opposition of the landed nobility in the Government Senate, whom the Czar supported 
(Korelin et al., 2005). This meant that his real power was mostly confined to the realm of 
banking, industry, and the stock exchange. Indeed, before the financial crisis, Witte 
emphasised weak corporate and stock exchange regulation as the recipe for a future 
disaster (Witte, 1898a). He also hoped that Russia would industrialise before there was a 
credit shortage in Europe. 
Witte’s first mistake was perhaps that he did not devote enough personal political 
power to strengthening corporate law. The extent to which he would have succeeded in 
this realm is unknown. However, any additional corporate regulation would have 
potentially made the crisis less severe by curtailing the establishment of speculative 
enterprises. In particular, the law of 1901, which prohibited banks’ executive board 
members from serving on corporations’ boards, if introduced earlier, would have limited 
the passage of privileged information between heavy industry and banks, and hence 
made bankers more cautious about the future prospects of firms in heavy industry. 
Strengthening banking regulation and imposing some level of personal liability 
on bankers would, in my opinion, have done little to change the unfolding situation 
because the bankers seemed to genuinely believe in the soundness of their loans to and 
investment in industry. Moreover, bankers were clearly operating under the assumption 
that if anything went wrong, the government would support the industrial sector. 
Another policy Witte could have attempted to do was to impose additional oversight on 
the companies receiving state procurement orders. Witte likely could have simply asked 
the Czar to approve such a law, bypassing the Government Senate altogether. Companies 
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receiving state procurement were known for managing their costs poorly. This targeted 
law might have done away with a lot of inefficiency in heavy industry. Indeed, the law 
of 1902 gave the Ministry of Finance some power to determine whether shares of a 
particular company would be allowed to float on stock exchanges (Complete Collection 
of Laws, 1902). 
Turning to the crisis period, the question of interest is: was the crisis response 
that successful after all? I believe there is one area where Witte could have made a big 
difference to the way the events unfolded. As foreign capital stopped flowing into Russia 
in 1899, Witte was ‘pretending’ to foreign financiers over the next few years that 
Russia’s coffers were plentiful and that no additional funding was needed (Siegel, 2015). 
Witte abstained from foreign borrowing because he believed borrowing on unfavourable 
terms would damage Russia’s credit (Siegel, 2015). In reality, heavy industry went into 
recession between 1901 and 1902 partially, if not mostly, because of the decline in state 
procurement, itself due to the lack of fiscal resources. 
During the crisis, there was a chance for a loan from Germany and for a deal 
with American bankers, albeit on unacceptable terms for Witte (Siegel, 2015). I believe 
Witte should have grasped all of those funding opportunities and made sure that heavy 
industry kept on producing at a steady level. Since the government was the main buyer 
of industrial products, Witte could have used his influence to force industry into 
becoming more competitive, and thus helped it to come out of the crisis stronger than 
before, rather than allowing companies to form inefficient cartels and syndicates. 
Finally, what could have been done to avoid the Revolution of 1905? The 
revolution was significant not only because of the partial victory of the working class, 
but also because it put Russia on the path of chaos, wars, ever-present fear for being 
designated as ‘enemy of the state’, and the pure personal drama that probably did not 
bypass a single family who lived in those years. This long epoch lasted for nearly 50 
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years, until Stalin’s death in 1953. What could have Witte done to place Russia on a 
more socially-stable trajectory? 
Witte might have expanded the number of factory inspectors to ensure that 
existing corporate and labour laws were enforced. The problem was not that there were 
no labour laws; rather, the problem was that existing laws, even if they were insufficient, 
were not stringently enforced. For example, in many cases, the truth was on a worker’s 
side, but factory inspectors would abstain from fully penalizing the company for 
breaking the labour law (Kirjanov, 1979). 
Witte’s ultimate goal was to preserve industrial activity and the political order, 
not individual workplaces. This became especially evident during the Revolution of 
1905, when Witte supported the ruthless suppression of any uprisings against the Czarist 
regime (Korelin & Stepanov, 1998). When the political order was not at stake, Witte 
cared deeply about regular people and fought, perhaps like no one else in the 
government, for their betterment (Korelin & Stepanov, 1998). It was, after all, Witte who 
wrote and then convinced the Czar to sign the October Manifesto in 1905 (Vvedensky, 
1952). Witte’s ultimate plan was to create world-class industries, the prosperity of which 
would trickle-down to workers. Meanwhile, impoverished workers could not wait until 
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